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 SUMMARY 
This is the Climate Change Authority's second review of the Renewable Energy Target (RET). The 
RET targets reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector and thereby 
contributes significantly to reducing Australia's overall emissions. 
In its 2012 review of the RET, the Authority found that the RET was stimulating considerable 
investment in renewable energy and argued that a stable and predictable policy was essential to 
sustain this investment. It concluded that no major changes were warranted to the overall RET 
design, but suggested some minor operational changes.  
The uncertain future of the Authority until recently has limited the time available to conduct this 
review. Largely for that reason, the Authority has focused on what, it its view, are the most important 
issues. The Authority has also drawn on both its 2012 Authority review, and on the review conducted 
this year by a panel headed by Mr Dick Warburton AO LVO.  
The RET and Australia's emissions reduction goals 
In 2010, when the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) was set at 41,000 GWh, it was 
estimated that this contribution, with contributions from the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme 
(SRES) and other pre-existing renewables (notably hydro), would together represent at least 
20 per cent of Australia’s (then) projected total electricity demand in 2020. Given that electricity 
accounts for approximately one-third of Australia’s emissions of greenhouse gases, renewable 
sources were seen as making a significant contribution to Australia’s broader emissions reduction 
goals. 
Reducing emissions in the electricity sector plays a pivotal role in climate change policies around the 
world. Unchecked climate change is widely seen as posing serious risks for the Australian 
community and its economy. Together with the broader international community, Australia has 
agreed to a goal of limiting global warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. This requires concerted action by all countries—
including Australia—to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The RET, as currently legislated, is a 
significant part of Australia’s policy response to that challenge. 
The RET arrangements were envisaged to deliver ‘at least 20 per cent’ of Australia’s electricity from 
renewable sources by 2020 and are projected to reduce Australia's emissions by 58 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2-e) over 2015–20, and by much larger amounts in later periods. 
The RET arrangements are not perfect but, in the Authority’s view, they are effective in reducing 
emissions (at reasonable cost) in the centrally important electricity sector. Given the absence of 
effective alternative measures bearing upon this sector, the Authority does not favour any significant 
scaling back of the 2020 LRET target of 41,000 GWh. 
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 Possible extension of end year for the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
In its 2012 review, the Authority considered the feasibility of achieving the 2020 LRET target. It 
concluded that the task was challenging but could be met, provided there was ongoing confidence on 
the part of renewables investors and assuming that the carbon price remained in place. Since then, 
confidence in the industry has waned and now investment has tapered off, on the back of the erosion 
of bipartisan support, continuing uncertainty about possible changes and the repeal of the carbon 
price. 
Confidence within the industry that bipartisan support for the LRET can be restored quickly in a 
convincing manner is essential to have a strong chance of achieving the 2020 goal of 41,000 GWh. 
At this time this is looking rather problematic. 
Another change which has occurred since the 2012 review is that the projected demand for electricity 
in the National Electricity Market in 2020 has declined by about 16 per cent. This would imply a 
somewhat greater adjustment on the part of incumbent generators than was previously envisaged. 
Having regard to these various changes—and to upholding the credibility of the present LRET 
target—the Authority recommends that the present target be preserved but the current 2020 
timeframe for achieving it be extended by, say, up to three years (Figure 1). As discussed in the 
report, two consequential changes would flow from the adoption of this recommendation: 
• the annual LRET targets should be re-phased after 2017  
• to assist delayed projects to recoup their costs, the end date for the LRET would need to be 
extended by at least the same number of years as the 2020 target was deferred. 
FIGURE 1 PROPOSED RE-PHASE FOR LRET TARGETS 
 
Source: Climate Change Authority 
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 Exemptions 
Exemptions from RET costs are provided to some business activities based on their overall 
emissions intensity, regardless of whether those emissions are related to electricity use. Providing 
assistance with electricity costs to businesses that are not particularly electricity intensive leads to 
anomalies and places greater costs onto non-exempt electricity users. If broadening of assistance is 
considered, it should be based on need, the best measure of which in this context is electricity 
intensity. 
The role of the RET after 2020 
The challenges of climate change are ongoing and Australia will need to pursue policies capable of 
reducing its emissions well into future. 
The government proposes to set Australia's post-2020 emissions reduction targets in the first half of 
2015. 
The Authority noted in its 2012 review that the RET was not a ‘first best’ approach to reducing 
emissions in the electricity sector. A more comprehensive approach that encouraged or discouraged 
different types of generation on the basis of their emissions intensity would be better in this sector in 
the long term. In the absence of such an approach, however, the Authority believes that increases in, 
and extensions of, the existing RET targets should remain an option in the period beyond 2020, as 
should expanding arrangements to cover a wider set of technologies. 
Rooftop solar under the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme 
The small-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) industry has been very successful in installing rooftop solar 
systems for Australian households, community groups and small businesses. Assistance provided 
under the SRES has encouraged this growth but, as costs have fallen, the case for maintaining 
current levels of support has become less compelling. Some evidence also suggests that subsidising 
small-scale PV at these levels is a relatively expensive way of reducing emissions from the electricity 
sector. 
That said, the cost impacts on electricity consumers are modest and the gradual phase-out of the 
scheme is to commence shortly. Any more rapid phase-out should be designed to avoid disruptive 
cycles in the industry. 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS NUMBER PAGE 
Substantial reductions in electricity sector emissions over the coming decades—
including through greater deployment of renewables—must be a key focus for 
Australia in playing its part in reducing global emissions and the risks of 
dangerous climate change. 
C 1 25 
The Renewable Energy Target arrangements are currently the primary policy 
instruments for electricity sector decarbonisation, and no more cost-effective and 
scalable measures are in prospect at this time. Their overall impacts on 
electricity consumers are quite modest, and are mitigated through the provision 
of targeted assistance. 
C 2 29 
If any further exemptions from electricity costs under the RET are to be granted, 
this should be on the basis of electricity intensity, rather than emissions intensity. 
C 3 43 
Subsidising household PV under the SRES is a relatively expensive way to 
reduce emissions in the electricity sector. The Authority, however, has not 
recommended any changes, largely because the SRES assistance will shortly 
begin to phase out, and the overall costs are relatively modest. 
C 4 53 
No changes should be made to the Renewable Energy Target framework to 
promote diversity of renewable technologies at this time. 
C 5 55 
In the interest of maintaining investor confidence in the industry, the frequency of 
statutory reviews of the RET should be changed from every two years to every 
four years. For the same reason, if bipartisan agreement were to be reached on 
any revisions to the current 2020 LRET target, those revised arrangements 
should be outside the scope of future reviews. 
C 6 55 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS NUMBER PAGE 
Given the sharp decline in investor confidence, the resulting slowdown in 
investment, and the further reduction in projected electricity demand, the 
government should: 
• defer the 2020 target for the LRET by, say, up to three years and 
• extend the scheme as a whole by at least the same amount of time, with a 
view to providing sufficient time for projects to recover their costs. 
Given the large overhang of certificates, there is no case to reduce the annual 
targets until after 2017. 
R.1 41 
Over the longer term increased recourse to renewables in electricity generation 
is essential to Australia’s efforts to reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions. In 
the absence of effective alternatives, RET arrangements will have to carry much 
of this burden, so consideration should be given—at the appropriate time—to the 
nature and timeframe of possible RET arrangements in the post 2020 period. In 
particular, the government should consider increasing and extending targets, 
and expanding arrangements to cover a wider set of technologies. 
R.2 44 
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 CHAPTER 1. ABOUT THIS REVIEW 
This chapter outlines the scope and context of the Climate Change Authority’s 2014 
Renewable Energy Target (RET) review. It provides information about the Authority and 
its approach to the review. 
1.1. THE CLIMATE CHANGE AUTHORITY 
The Climate Change Authority ('Authority') is an independent statutory agency, established to 
provide expert advice on Australian climate change policy, including through a scheduled series of 
reviews of climate programs and legislation.  
The Authority currently comprises a Chair (Mr Bernie Fraser) and four members with expertise 
including in climate science, economics, and public policy. Its work is guided by a set of principles 
under the Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth), which requires the Authority to have regard to 
the following matters: 
• economic efficiency 
• environmental effectiveness 
• equity 
• the public interest 
• the impact on households, business, workers and communities 
• the development of an effective global response to climate change 
• Australia’s foreign policy and trade objectives  
• any additional principles the Authority considers relevant.  
1.2. APPROACH AND CONTEXT 
The Authority's requirements for reviewing the RET are set out in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Act 2000 (Cth) (the REE Act) and Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (see Appendix B). Any 
recommendations must be consistent with the objects of the REE Act (s. 3) which are to: 
• encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources 
• reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector 
• ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable. 
The Authority reviewed the RET in 2012. In that review the Authority emphasised the role of the RET 
in reducing emissions and the importance of a stable and predictable policy environment to its 
success. It concluded that no major changes were warranted to the overall scheme, but suggested 
some minor operational changes.  
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The Authority conducted its 2012 review against the policy backdrop existing at that time. Since then, 
significant changes have occurred. In particular, the carbon pricing mechanism has been repealed 
and the outlook for electricity demand is more subdued than it was in 2012.  
The government initiated a new review of the RET in 2014 by a panel headed by 
Mr Dick Warburton AO LVO, and supported by a secretariat located within the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The report of the Expert Panel (hereafter, the 'Warburton review' 
report) was released in August 2014. The review concluded that the cost of the RET outweighed its 
benefits and that significant change was required. The review recommended that: 
• the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) be either closed to new entrants or modified 
so that targets to 2020 are set one year in advance and increase by half of projected additional 
electricity demand in that year.  
• the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) be either terminated immediately or phased 
out more rapidly (by 2020 rather than 2030). 
A full list of the Authority's 2012 recommendations and those of the 2014 Warburton review are at 
Appendix C. Consistent with its 2012 report and in line with its legislative requirements, the 
Authority's 2014 RET review pays particular attention to: 
• the objective of reducing emissions (both now and in the longer term)  
• the research demonstrating the crucial role that decarbonisation of the electricity sector will play 
as Australia and the world move to a low-emissions economy.   
The Authority concluded in its 2012 review that two-yearly reviews of the RET risked undermining 
policy stability and investment in the sector and recommended that they occur only every four years 
(CCA 2012, p. 39); this recommendation has not been implemented and the Authority's statutory 
obligation to conduct this review remains in place.  
1.3. SCOPE OF REVIEW AND REPORT STRUCTURE 
This review covers a small number of issues which the Authority believes are of most significance at 
this time. The lingering uncertainty about the future of the Authority has also necessitated the fairly 
narrow focus of the review. As appropriate, the Authority has drawn on previous consultation and 
analysis from both the 2012 Authority review and this year’s Warburton review.  
The important issues considered by the Authority include: 
• The role of the electricity and renewables sectors in contributing to the goal of keeping global 
average warming to below 2 degrees (chapter 2).  
• The case for rescheduling the LRET target; the appropriateness of current assistance to 
emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities; and the role of the RET after 2020 (chapter 3).  
• Whether any changes should be made to the level of assistance provided to small-scale solar 
photovoltaic (PV) generation under the SRES (chapter 4).  
• Whether any changes to the RET design to promote access by more diverse renewable 
technologies are warranted; and the appropriate frequency of statutory reviews of the RET 
(chapter 5).  
The limited scope of this review has meant that some questions, such as the treatment of larger, 
commercial-scale PV, could not be addressed on this occasion. For the same reason the Authority  
did not commission additional economic modelling of the electricity sector for this review, but has 
drawn on several previous exercises including modelling commissioned for the Authority’s earlier 
review and the Warburton review. 
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1.4. CONSULTATION  
The Authority has reviewed the public submissions made to the Warburton review, and met with and 
secured input from interested stakeholders (see Appendix A for a list of submissions received). The 
Authority would like to thank the people and organisations who contributed time and expertise to the 
review. 
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 CHAPTER 2. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
TARGET AND AUSTRALIA'S 
EMISSIONS REDUCTION TASK 
The RET works by creating a market for additional renewable electricity that supports 
investment in new renewable generation capacity.  
This chapter outlines the operation and impacts of the RET and places them in the broader 
context of Australia's emissions reduction goals. 
It examines Australian and international research on the transition to a low-emissions 
economy. This suggests major decarbonisation of electricity systems by 2050 is required to 
reduce the risks of dangerous climate change. Two consistent findings of this research are 
that significantly more needs to be done both before and beyond 2020 to reduce electricity 
sector emissions, and that renewable energy is likely to play a major role in this task.  
This chapter also considers the extent to which the RET is the ‘right’ policy instrument for 
reducing electricity sector emissions. It finds that the RET can make significant emissions 
reductions at reasonable cost, with modest impacts on electricity consumers.  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The RET arrangements are designed to deliver the equivalent of at least 20 per cent of Australia's 
electricity from renewable sources by 2020 (see Box 1). The term 'equivalent' is used because the 
scheme includes displacement technologies, such as solar water heaters, which reduce electricity 
demand rather than generate electricity.  The primary legislation for the RET, the REE Act, sets out 
the formal objects of the Act which are to: 
• encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources 
• reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector 
• ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable. 
The RET's objectives should be seen in the context of Australia's broader goal of contributing to 
global efforts to reduce the risks posed by climate change.  
 
 THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET AND AUSTRALIA'S EMISSIONS REDUCTION TASK | 15 
 
2.2. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET—ITS OPERATION AND 
IMPACTS 
2.2.1. HOW THE RET WORKS 
The RET works by creating a market for additional renewable electricity that supports investment in 
new renewable generation capacity. It places a legal obligation on entities that purchase wholesale 
electricity (mainly electricity retailers) to surrender a certain number of certificates to the Clean 
Energy Regulator (CER) each year. These certificates are generated by accredited renewable power 
stations and eligible small-scale renewable technologies. Each certificate represents one megawatt 
hour (MWh) of additional renewable energy for compliance purposes; the certificates are tradeable 
and can be 'banked' for use in later compliance years. If a liable entity does not surrender the 
number of certificates required, a 'shortfall charge' of $65/MWh applies to the outstanding amount. 
Costs incurred by purchasing certificates are tax-deductible, while the payment of the shortfall 
charge is not. Assistance with the costs of the RET is provided to eligible emissions-intensive, 
trade-exposed businesses. Generators producing and consuming their own electricity 
(‘self-generators’) are exempt. 
Since 2011, the RET has operated as two schemes—the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
(LRET) and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES).  
The LRET supports large-scale renewable energy projects, such as wind and large-scale solar 
generators, by helping to bridge the cost between renewable and fossil-fuel generation. It sets 
annual targets for the amount of large-scale renewable energy; these targets rise to 41,000 GWh in 
2020 and stay constant at that level until the scheme ends in 2030 (see Figure 9 in chapter 3). These 
annual targets are allocated among liable parties in proportion to their purchases of wholesale 
electricity.  
The SRES helps households, small businesses and community groups with the upfront cost of 
installing small-scale renewable systems, such as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) systems and solar 
hot water heaters. The SRES has no fixed annual targets; rather, liable entities are obliged to 
purchase all of the certificates generated from the installation of eligible small-scale systems. Unlike 
the LRET, where certificates are generated in arrears, owners of eligible small-scale technologies 
receive certificates upfront for the amount of renewable electricity the system is 'deemed' to create 
over a given period. This approach reduces the administrative burden on households and the CER. 
The scheme will phase out gradually (from 2017 or 2022 depending on the technology), with the 
number of years of deeming reducing by one each year until the scheme ends in 2030. Small-scale 
technology certificates (STCs) can be sold through the Clearing House for $40; this provides a price 
cap for the scheme, the level of which can be altered by the Minister.  
The Authority's 2012 RET review provides further detail about the operation of the two schemes.  
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 BOX 1 ‘AT LEAST 20 PER CENT' AND THE 41,000 GWh TARGET 
The RET aims to ensure that ‘the equivalent of at least 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity generation comes from 
renewable resources by 2020’ (Explanatory Memorandum, REE Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth)). To meet this target, 
the legislation specifies a fixed amount of large-scale electricity generation each year, providing clear signals about 
the amount of large-scale generation capacity required to meet the targets. The legislated 2020 LRET target is 
41,000 GWh. The amount of renewable energy in Australia in 2020 was never going to be exactly 20 per cent. It will 
be higher or lower depending on several factors, including overall demand for electricity. The SRES is uncapped. 
In its 2012 RET review, the Authority considered the merits of fixed versus floating targets and preferred a fixed 
target, based on the argument that setting gigawatt hour targets to achieve a particular share of demand would 
require continuous revision, leading to significant uncertainty about the amount of investment required to meet the 
target. 
Estimates of the share of electricity that will be supplied by renewable generation in 2020 vary depending on both 
the method used (for example, what counts as renewable energy) and the projections of future electricity supply and 
renewable energy generation.  
The RET (and Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) before it) was designed to encourage additional 
renewable electricity generation, so generation from pre-existing renewable plant needs to be considered when 
estimating the total share of renewables in a given year. This means there are three distinct components that affect 
the share of renewable energy:  
• electricity demand  
• eligible generation under the RET (both large-scale and small-scale) 
• 'below baseline' generation from renewable generators that existed before the MRET ('pre-existing' renewable 
generators). Pre-existing renewable generators are allocated baselines based on their average historical output and 
are eligible to receive certificates for output above these baselines. The amount of generation below their baselines 
needs to be added to generation from the RET to get the total amount of renewable generation.    
When the initial 20 per cent by 2020 target was translated to a fixed gigawatt hour amount in 2007, Australia-wide 
electricity supply was projected to be about 300,000 GWh in 2020 and below-baseline generation was expected to 
be about 15,000 GWh per year (CCA 2012, p. 43). With a RET of 45,000 GWh per year by 2020, this translated into 
a total renewable energy contribution of 60,000 GWh per year, equivalent to 20 per cent of (then) forecast demand 
in 2020. When the RET was split, the LRET target was revised to 41,000 GWh in 2020 (and through to 2030) and 
the SRES was left uncapped, but notionally allocated at least 4,000 GWh. 
Over time, projections have changed, increasing the projected share of renewable energy in 2020. In 2012, the 
Authority projected the share of renewables in 2020 would be about 26 per cent. The updated forecasts included in 
the Warburton review project a 2020 renewables share of 26 per cent (if displacement from solar hot water is 
excluded) or 28 per cent (if it is included, as per the Authority's analysis, which was based on previous approaches). 
Table 1 compares the modelling outputs and resulting share of renewables from the two reviews.  
TABLE 1 PROJECTED SHARE OF RENEWABLES IN 2020, DIFFERENT RET REVIEWS 
 LRET 
target 
(GWh) 
Below 
base-
line 
gen. 
(GWh) 
Solar PV 
(GWh) 
SHW  
(GWh 
displaced) 
Total  
renewables  
(GWh) 
Total  
generation  
(GWh) 
Share of 
renewables in 
2020 (%) 
CCA 2012 
RET Review 
(p. 43) 
41,000 14,300 7,900 3,000 66,200 258,500 26 
2014 
Warburton 
review (pp. 
126-130) 
41,000 16,150 9,920 
3,500  
(not in 
Warburton 
method) 
70,570 255,300 28 
Source: Climate Change Authority based on CCA 2012 and Warburton review 2014 
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2.2.2. RENEWABLES CAPACITY AND GENERATION SO FAR 
The recent Warburton review found that the RET has been successful in promoting additional 
generation from renewable sources. Over 2001–2014, more than 400 renewable power stations with 
a total capacity of more than 5,000 MW were installed under the RET—equivalent to about 
10 per cent of Australia's current grid-connected capacity (Climate Change Authority calculation 
based on Warburton review 2014 and Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) 2014). About 
three-quarters of this is wind power; the rest includes biomass, hydro, landfill gas and solar 
(Warburton review 2014, p. 8). Figures 2 to 4 show the increase in renewable generation over 2001–
2013. The amount of renewable energy generation almost doubled over the period, from about 
17,800 GWh in 2001–02 to about 32,500 GWh in 2012–13, with the share of renewables rising from 
eight to 13 per cent over the same period.  
So far, about 2.2 million small-scale renewable systems have been installed under the RET (Clean 
Energy Regulator 2014a). About 1.3 million of these are small-scale solar PV systems, which have 
been installed by more than 10 per cent of Australian households (ACIL Allen 2013a, p. viii).  
To date, the emissions reductions from the RET have been relatively small, because annual targets 
have been relatively low. Modelling by SKM for the Clean Energy Council estimated that Australia’s 
emissions over 2001–2012 were 22.5 Mt CO2-e lower with the RET in place (SKM 2012, p. 1). This is 
equivalent to about 10 per cent of Australia's current annual electricity sector emissions (CCA 2014, 
p. 159). 
FIGURE 2 GENERATION BY FUEL SOURCE, AUSTRALIA, 2001–2013 
 
Note: Other (renewables) includes bagasse (wood), biogas and geothermal. Other (non-renewables) includes oil products and 
multi-fuel-fired power plants. Year refers to financial year ending June. Solar PV includes rooftop solar; generation includes off-
grid. 
Source: BREE 2014 
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FIGURE 3 SHARE OF RENEWABLES IN AUSTRALIAN ELECTRICITY GENERATION, 2001–2013 
 
Source: Climate Change Authority based on BREE 2014 
 
FIGURE 4 GENERATION AND DISPLACEMENT FROM SOLAR PV AND HOT WATER, 2001–2013 
 
Note: 'SWH'= solar water heater. 
Source: Warburton review 2014 
2.2.3. PROJECTED IMPACTS OF THE RET AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION 
The rest of this section looks at RET’s likely future performance, resource costs and the distribution 
of those costs. As mentioned, the Authority has not conducted any new modelling for this review, but 
has drawn on a number of published studies on the impacts of the RET, including the modelling by 
ACIL Allen commissioned for the Warburton review and by SKM MMA for the Authority's 2012 
review. Box 2 in chapter 3 compares these and other recent studies. 
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The RET is projected to deliver substantial volumes of emissions reductions in the future: modelling 
for the Warburton review (2014, p. 41) estimates that (relative to a scenario in which the RET was 
repealed) the current RET would reduce emissions by: 
• 58 Mt CO2-e over 2015–2020—about the same as annual emissions from all of Australia’s 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (CCA 2014a)  
• 299 Mt over 2015–2030—about half of Australia’s current total annual emissions (CCA 2014b). 
These projected emissions reductions result from increasing the amount of renewables in the 
generation mix, which has an economic cost. The cost of the RET is commonly measured by its 
incremental resource cost to the electricity sector; that is, the difference between the net present 
value (NPV) of the resources allocated to the electricity sector with or without the RET in place. The 
incremental resource costs include the costs of building and running a renewable plant, minus the 
avoided fuel costs of displaced fossil fuel plant, other avoided running costs, and any avoided capital 
costs. The RET generally raises the capital cost of generation, which is partly offset by lower ongoing 
costs. ACIL Allen estimated the additional resource cost of the current RET to 2030 at 
$10,430 million in NPV terms relative to a situation of no RET (in 2014 dollars, ACIL Allen 2014, 
p. 116). 
Dividing the incremental resource cost of the RET by its emissions reductions gives the average 
cost per tonne, a measure of the policy's cost effectiveness. The Warburton review provides 
estimates of the average cost of emissions reductions from the RET, the LRET and solar PV under 
the SRES, calculated in two different ways (Table 2). It estimates the cost of the LRET from 2014–
2030 to be $32 per tonne (when future emissions reductions are not discounted), or $62 per tonne 
(when the emissions reductions are discounted at the same rate as future resource costs). 
Subsidising rooftop PV is more expensive per tonne of emissions reductions, at $95 per tonne 
without discounting. The method of estimating the cost per tonne of emissions reductions under the 
RET is discussed further in section 4.3. 
TABLE 2 ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS OF THE RET FROM ACIL 
ALLEN MODELLING  
 Cost per tonne ($/tCO2-e)  
 
 
2014–2030 2014–2040 
 RET LRET Rooftop PV RET LRET Rooftop PV 
Undiscounted 
emissions reductions 35 32 95 25 22 79 
Discounted emissions 
reductions 68 62 175 62 56 185 
Note: ‘undiscounted emissions reductions’ means that future emissions reductions are not discounted relative to those today. 
‘Discounted emissions reductions’ means that emissions reductions in the future are discounted at the same rate as future 
resource costs (a 7 per cent real discount rate). The Authority considers the estimate with undiscounted emissions is the more 
appropriate measure. See text for further details.  
Source: Warburton review 2014 
The Authority considers the estimate with undiscounted emissions is the more appropriate measure. 
Unlike holdings of money, over the timeframes and volumes of emissions reductions considered 
here, a tonne of emissions reductions in the future is as valuable as a tonne now, as it has the same 
consequences for climate change outcomes. In its 2012 review, the Authority did not discount future 
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emissions reductions, and estimated the average cost of the RET to be $40 per tonne (in 2012 
dollars).  
Looking beyond the resource cost of the RET, the scheme has distributional impacts on households 
and businesses. These impacts arise from changes in the wholesale and retail prices of electricity 
which affect electricity consumers' purchasing power and the profits of existing generators. These 
price changes are different from the 'costs of the RET to the economy'—they involve transfers from 
some households or businesses to others. 
Retail electricity prices are made up of the costs of generating, transmitting, distributing and selling 
the electricity to end users. The overall impact of the RET on retail prices is the net impact of two 
main effects that work in different directions: 
• The RET tends to lower wholesale electricity prices—because the RET increases the available 
supply of electricity from sources with lower operating costs than fossil fuel generation. 
• The RET tends to raise the retail component of electricity prices—retailers have to purchase 
certificates to acquit their RET liabilities, the costs of which are passed on to customers. 
Existing generators are affected in two ways. Increased generation displaces fossil-fuelled plant 
output. Also, lower wholesale prices mean they make less money for the electricity they sell.  
The impact on households and other retail customers depends on the relative size of the wholesale 
and retail price effects. For a particular level of renewable capacity, the larger the wholesale price 
effect, the smaller the overall cost impact on consumers; the magnitude of these impacts is 
discussed in section 2.5.  
2.3. AUSTRALIA'S EMISSIONS REDUCTION TASK  
Climate change poses serious risks for the Australian community and its economy. Together with the 
broader international community, Australia has agreed to a goal of limiting average global warming to 
no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels to avoid the worst impacts of climate 
change. This requires large and ongoing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by all countries, 
including Australia.  
Australia’s emissions were about 600 Mt CO2-e in 2012, 2.5 per cent above 2000 levels (CCA 2014, 
p. 86). With the currently legislated RET in place, but without other strong policies, the most recent 
official estimates projected that emissions would grow to 685 Mt in 2020, 17 per cent above 2000 
levels (Treasury and Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and 
Tertiary Education (DIICCSRTE) 2013). The next set of official projections is expected to be lower, 
reflecting the effects of structural changes in the Australian economy, behavioural change and the 
impacts of past policies, including energy efficiency (see, for example, Frontier Economics 2014). 
Even if the growth in emissions slows, however, absolute emissions are likely to grow in the absence 
of additional strong policies. 
Australia has an international undertaking to reduce its emissions by 5–25 per cent by 2020, relative 
to 2000 levels, and is considering its goals for reductions beyond 2020. The government has 
indicated it will make decisions on post-2020 targets in the first half of 2015. 
In its Targets and Progress review, the Authority considered Australia’s current (and prospective) 
emissions reduction goals. It recommended a long-term emissions budget for Australia that is 
consistent with the 2 degrees goal, and corresponding short-term and medium-term targets of: 
• a minimum 15 per cent reduction compared with 2000 levels by 2020 (which increased to 
19 per cent when taking account of surplus emissions units carried over from the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol)  
• between 40 and 60 per cent reductions compared with 2000 levels by 2030 (CCA 2014, p. 10). 
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Based on the available evidence, the Authority concluded that Australia’s minimum 5 per cent 2020 
target is inadequate, because it does not keep pace with the action taken by many other countries 
and is inconsistent with the 2 degrees goal (CCA 2014, pp. 121–2).  
Since that review climate scientists have reaffirmed their conclusions about the risks ahead, and 
some of the world’s largest emitters have announced commitments for post-2020 action: 
• The United States has pledged to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 
28 per cent—compared with 2005 levels—by 2025 (White House 2014). 
• China has pledged to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and to increase its non-fossil fuel share of 
energy to around 20 per cent by that year. 
• The European Union has pledged to cut greenhouse gases by at least 40 per cent from 1990 
levels by 2030 (Barroso 2014). 
2.4. THE ROLE OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR  
The electricity sector features prominently in Australian and international research on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, with a consistent finding that limiting warming to no more than 2 degrees 
would require virtual decarbonisation of global electricity systems by 2050 (Sachs et al., 2014, p. 32; 
IPCC 2014b p. 64, IEA 2014a p. 125).  
The electricity sector is important for three reasons:  
• It accounts for a significant share of current emissions—one-third of Australia's total emissions 
and 28 per cent of total global emissions (CCA 2014, p. 246, Audoly et al. 2014, p. 1). 
• Deep cuts in electricity sector emissions are technically feasible with currently known 
technologies, and more cost-effective than deep cuts in some other sectors. 
• Low- and zero-emission electricity generation can be a precursor to feasible, least-cost 
decarbonisation pathways for the sectors that use energy. 
The survey of decarbonisation pathways by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
2014b) found that in least-cost pathways consistent with less than 2 degrees of warming, the 
electricity sector is decarbonised more rapidly, whereas deep reductions in emissions in some other 
sectors accrue after 2050 (IPCC 2014b pp. 6-86). In these scenarios, renewables are projected to 
replace fossil fuels as the dominant source of electricity generation by 2050. In the International 
Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) 2 degree scenario, for example, renewables are projected to surpass 70 per 
cent of global generation capacity by 2050, with fossil fuels declining to just over 20 per cent and 
nuclear maintaining its current share of seven per cent (IEA 2014a, p. 125). The importance of 
decarbonising global electricity supplies for reducing energy emissions is reflected in the IEA's 
(2014b) advice to policy-makers in the lead up to the climate change negotiations in Lima this month: 
electricity sector decarbonisation is one of five priority actions on the IEA's list for reducing energy 
sector emissions. 
Substantial decarbonisation of electricity supply facilitates decarbonisation for energy-consuming 
sectors, as electricity can displace the direct use of fossil fuels for energy (IEA 2014a, pp. 127-128; 
Sachs et al. 2014, pp. 12-13). Recent modelling for Australia conducted as part of a multi-country 
United Nations project (Pathways to Deep Decarbonisation in 2050) provides examples:   
• In industry, emissions could fall 60 per cent on 2012 levels by 2050, driven substantially by 
decarbonisation of the electricity supply and electrification of industrial processes (ClimateWorks 
Australia et al. 2014a, p. 25). 
• Emissions from Australian buildings could be virtually eliminated by 2050 through a combination 
of energy efficiency and switching from gas to electricity for all heating, hot water and cooking 
(ClimateWorks Australia et al. 2014b, p. 120). 
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• Emissions from road transport, which currently accounts for the vast majority of transport 
emissions, could be reduced by about 70 per cent by 2050 (ClimateWorks Australia et al. 2014b 
p.69, CCA 2014b p.17). Much of this is due to a substantial shift towards electric and hybrid light 
vehicles. Emissions from cars and light commercial vehicles are projected to fall by around 
85 per cent between 2012-2050, while kilometres travelled grow by about 75 per cent over the 
same period (ClimateWorks Australia 2014b p. 67, p.69).  
Australia's current trends lag well behind these projections. In 2012, the emissions intensity of 
Australia's electricity supply was higher than China’s and 87 per cent above the OECD average (IEA 
2014c, pp. II.61-3). Even with the currently legislated RET (but without other strong policies): 
• the emissions intensity of Australia's electricity supply is projected to decline only slightly, from 
0.78 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per megawatt hour (tCO2-e/MWh) in 2012 to 
0.69 tCO2-e/MWh in 2030 (CCA 2014, p. 250)  
• absolute emissions from electricity generation are projected to grow.  
For Australia to get onto a cost-effective pathway consistent with global action to limit warming to no 
more than 2 degrees, the emissions intensity of its electricity would need to fall rapidly. Modelling 
conducted for the Authority's Targets and Progress review projected about a 70 per cent reduction 
on 2012 emissions intensity levels by 2030, and about a 90 per cent reduction by 2050. This trend is 
projected to hold even in the case of weaker global action—a scenario consistent with limiting 
warming to 3 degrees found emissions intensity would fall 15 per cent below 2012 levels by 2030 
and about 65 per cent by 2050 (Figure 5). 
FIGURE 5 CHANGES IN EMISSIONS INTENSITY OF AUSTRALIA'S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY TO 
2050—2 AND 3 DEGREE SCENARIOS 
  
Note: The 2 degree scenario is the 'high' scenario and the 3 degree scenario the 'central policy' scenario from modelling for the 
Authority’s Targets and Progress review. Both scenarios assume a fixed carbon price to July 2014, with the 2 and 3 degree 
scenarios reaching $65/t CO2-e and $27/t CO2-e in 2020, respectively. Prices are in real 2012 Australian dollars.  
Source: Climate Change Authority 2014 based on Treasury and DIICCSRTE 2013 and ACIL Allen 2013b  
This modelling—and the projected decline in emissions intensity—reflects a strong shift from fossil 
fuel to renewable generation, with the share of total renewable generation increasing from 
12 per cent in 2012 to about 70 per cent in 2030 in the 2 degree scenario, and to about 25 per cent 
in the 3 degree scenario (Figure 6).  
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The Pathways to Deep Decarbonisation modelling discussed above reinforces these findings. It 
suggests that even if other zero- or low-emissions technologies are deployed—such as nuclear and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS)—renewables would still dominate the generation mix 
(ClimateWorks Australia et al. 2014b). The project investigated three pathways for electricity 
generation consistent with the Authority's recommended long-term emissions budget for Australia, 
namely: a 100 per cent renewable grid scenario; a scenario in which CCS is included in the possible 
technology mix; and a scenario in which CCS and nuclear are included (ClimateWorks Australia et 
al. 2014a p.22, 2014b pp. 42-5). Even in the nuclear and CCS scenarios, renewables are projected 
to account for more than 70 per cent of total generation in 2050. 
FIGURE 6 AUSTRALIA'S CURRENT AND PROJECTED SHARE OF RENEWABLES IN ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION TO 2050, VARIOUS SCENARIOS   
 
Note: Generation is calculated in GWh sent out. ‘Renewables’ includes hydro, wind, geothermal, biomass, solar thermal and solar 
PV (including rooftop solar). Generation displaced by solar water heating is not included in the share of renewables. Non-
renewable generation includes coal, gas, cogeneration, liquid fuel, black coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) and gas with 
CCS. CCS technology plays a larger role under a 2 degree scenario from 2030 resulting in a lower share of renewables in 2050 
than in the 3 degree scenario. 
Source: Climate Change Authority based on ACIL Allen 2013b 
 
The modelling discussed above projects a major and expanding role for large-scale renewables 
through to 2050. On the other hand, some changes underway in the electricity sector—including 
rapid reductions in small-scale battery costs—could result in a more decentralised electricity sector in 
the future. This raises the question of whether near-term investment in large-scale renewables may 
be stranded if the grid was to become much more decentralised over the coming decades. 
While it is impossible to know how the sector will evolve, modelling for the CSIRO’s Future Grid 
Forum (Graham et al. 2013, pp.53, 68, 84) provides some insights. Even across scenarios resulting 
in extremely different levels of centralised electricity generation in 2050, investment in large-scale 
renewables to 2020 is reasonably similar. This suggests near-term investment in large-scale 
renewables could be robust to a range of possible futures. 
In summary, the available studies consistently find: 
• Significantly more will need to be done to reduce emissions beyond 2020 to keep Australia on a 
path towards limiting global warming to no more than 2 or even 3 degrees. 
• Renewables are likely to play a major role in decarbonising future electricity supplies.  
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 CONCLUSION 
C 1. Substantial reductions in electricity sector emissions over the coming decades—
including through greater deployment of renewables—must be a key focus for Australia 
in playing its part in reducing global emissions and the risks of dangerous climate 
change.  
 
2.5. IS THE RET AN APPROPRIATE POLICY INSTRUMENT?  
In its 2012 review, the Authority concluded that while the RET was not a perfect policy, the benefits 
of any changes should be assessed in light of their implications for ongoing investment in 
renewables. Since then, many stakeholders have suggested the RET should be reduced or 
abolished, arguing that: 
• lower cost emissions reductions exist elsewhere  
• the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) should be the main policy in the economy and the 
electricity supply sector  
• the distribution of costs (including their incidence on existing fossil fuel generators) is 
undesirable.  
The Authority’s responses are listed below and elaborated in the subsequent sections: 
• some cheaper emissions reductions are available elsewhere, but policy needs to consider the 
size and cost of the overall emissions reduction task 
• within the electricity supply sector, it is doubtful that the prospective alternative policies would 
deliver comparable reductions 
• the size and incidence of the RET's impacts do not warrant reductions in the targets. 
This section expands upon each point in turn. 
2.5.1. SOME CHEAPER REDUCTIONS ARE AVAILABLE, BUT POLICY NEEDS 
TO CONSIDER THE SIZE AND COST OF THE OVERALL TASK 
As discussed in section 2.4, decarbonising the electricity supply sector is a critical part of Australia's 
transition to a low-emissions economy; this requires policies capable of making substantial 
reductions in electricity sector emissions.  
Some lower-cost emissions reduction opportunities do exist in Australia outside the electricity supply 
sector, and the Authority expects that some of these will be picked up by the ERF (CCA 2014c) or 
other current policies.  
The existence of such opportunities, however, is not sufficient to conclude that the RET is too 
expensive. Policy-makers need to consider the overall size of Australia's emissions reduction task 
and the costs for achieving not just some but all of the reductions required to meet Australia's 
targets. This includes considering the cost of the most expensive of those units (the ‘marginal cost’ or 
the cost ‘at the margin’).  
The government's latest estimate of Australia's emissions reduction task is 421 Mt between 2015 
and 2020 (Department of the Environment 2014). This is based on results of modelling by the 
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Australian Treasury for the Authority’s Targets and Progress review (Treasury and DIICCSRTE 
2013), which suggests that to achieve even Australia’s minimum 2020 commitment of a 5 per cent 
emissions reduction target domestically would cost up to $65 per tonne (in 2012 dollars) at the 
margin with the carbon pricing mechanism in place. That modelling assumed that the current RET 
remained in place. If the RET target were to be weakened or abolished, more emissions reductions 
would be required elsewhere and the marginal cost of delivering those additional reductions would 
be expected to be at least as high.  
Sustained weak electricity demand means that the emissions reduction task to 2020 is likely to be 
smaller than previously estimated. Frontier Economics (2014, p. 7), for example, estimates that 
downward revisions to electricity demand forecasts will lower Australia's emissions reduction task by 
142–196 Mt over 2014–2020. This would reduce the marginal cost of achieving the minus 5 per cent 
target. That said, there is no guarantee that it would reduce the cost to a level less than the average 
cost per tonne of a lower RET. 
At an average cost of $35 per tonne to 2030 (Table 2), the Authority believes the RET is making a 
reasonably cost-effective contribution to emissions reductions in a strategically important sector—
both out to 2020 and beyond, when steeper reductions will be required.  
2.5.2. WITHIN THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SECTOR, PROSPECTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES ARE UNLIKELY TO DELIVER COMPARABLE 
REDUCTIONS 
Policies to reduce emissions from electricity can operate in one or more of the following five ways:  
• using existing lower emissions plant more intensively ('fuel-switching') 
• improving the efficiency of existing fossil-fuel power stations so that they produce fewer 
emissions per unit of electricity 
• retiring higher emissions plant  
• building new zero- or low-emissions generation (large- or small-scale)  
• reducing the demand for electricity by improving household and business energy efficiency.  
Improving energy efficiency can often provide substantial low cost (or even financially beneficial) 
ways of reducing Australia's emissions (see for example CCA 2014a, p. 160). This can reduce 
overall electricity demand, but will not reduce the emissions intensity of the electricity supply. 
The government is implementing the ERF as the centrepiece of its climate policy to reduce 
emissions across the economy. As discussed in the Authority’s Carbon Farming Initiative review 
(CCA 2014c), the crediting part of ERF (as currently designed) is not well suited to encouraging new 
zero- or low-emissions plant because the contract period is short relative to the life of the large 
infrastructure investment. It could encourage efficiency improvement at existing plants, but is less 
suited to encouraging fuel-switching, as reductions are assessed at the facility level, rather than 
across the generation fleet as a whole.  
The government is also designing a ‘safeguard mechanism’ to complement the ERF crediting 
mechanism. This remains under development (and is planned to commence from 1 July 2016), and 
the ERF White Paper notes that the application of the safeguard mechanism to the electricity sector 
would be a matter for industry consultation, given the interactions with other policies such as the 
RET. Given these uncertainties, there is no basis at this time to assume the ERF will be effective in 
delivering comparable volumes of emissions reductions to the RET at lower prices.  
Renewable deployment policies like the RET reduce emissions through encouraging new 
zero-emissions plant. While performance depends on the specifics of the design, schemes like the 
LRET are considered to be a relatively cost-effective way of reducing electricity sector emissions. 
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The Productivity Commission’s 2011 review of more than 1,000 emissions reduction policies in nine 
countries concluded that, while emissions trading schemes delivered the lowest cost emissions 
reductions (by using all five of the options above), schemes to encourage the deployment of 
large-scale renewable energy were the next most cost-effective set of policies in the electricity supply 
sector. Within those policies, renewable energy targets such as Australia’s were found to be more 
cost effective than schemes that set the price for, rather than the quantity of, renewables 
(Productivity Commission 2011, pp. xiv, 80–1). 
In the Authority’s view, the RET is the only currently prospective policy instrument in the electricity 
supply sector that can be relied upon to deliver sizeable volumes of emissions reductions.   
2.5.3. THE SIZE AND INCIDENCE OF THE RET'S IMPACTS DO NOT WARRANT 
REDUCTIONS IN THE TARGETS 
Another objection to the RET raised by some stakeholders (see section 3.2) is that, even if its overall 
costs are reasonable, the burden on particular groups (in particular on existing fossil fuel generators) 
is too high.  
As outlined in section 2.2.3, consumers and electricity generators share the costs of the RET and the 
impact of the RET on consumer prices is the net impact of two main effects that work in different 
directions.  
ACIL's modelling for the Warburton review indicated that the RET would have almost no impact on 
consumer prices over the period 2015–2030: 
• the wholesale and retail price impacts of the RET are projected to offset each other in NPV 
terms to 2030 
• over the period to 2040, the RET is projected to make households better off.  
The impacts of reducing the current RET are discussed further in section 3.2.  
In the near term, the RET is projected to increase retail electricity prices by a small amount, with a 
typical household projected to pay about $250 more in total over the period 2015–2020 (in present 
value terms). This is considered a modest impact and is mitigated through the provision of targeted 
assistance (see AEMC 2014, p. 198 for current electricity concessions). Beyond 2020, the RET is 
projected to reduce retail prices by a small amount, which is why the net impact over the period to 
2030 is projected to be neutral.  
Other modelling exercises point to similarly modest impacts on household bills. Modelling by 
SKM MMA for the Authority's 2012 RET review suggested that, on average, the RET would increase 
household electricity bills by $15 per year over 2012–13 to 2030–31 (in 2012 dollars, CCA 2012, 
p. 150). Looking across other recent modelling exercises on the impacts of the RET (see Box 2), 
some project that the RET slightly lowers retail prices and some that it slightly raises them, but the 
projected changes in household bills are modest in either direction.  
The RET’s impact on electricity bills for commercial and non-exempt industrial users are also 
considered to be modest. ACIL Allen’s modelling for the Warburton review indicated that the RET 
would increase electricity prices for commercial and industrial customers to 2020, but lower them in 
the period out to 2040 (Warburton review 2014, p.37). Modelling by SKM MMA projected that the 
RET would increase average electricity bills for small and medium enterprises by $17 per year over 
the period 2012–13 to 2030–31 (in 2012 dollars; CCA 2012, p. 151). When these costs are 
expressed as a share of electricity bills, they tend to be higher than for households because 
businesses generally have lower electricity tariffs (CCA 2012, p. 151).  
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The impacts of RET costs on very large energy users are difficult to assess because they generally 
have private bilateral contracts with their electricity retailer; the most emissions-intensive users 
receive partial assistance for the impacts of the RET on their electricity costs (see section 3.3).  
The RET lowers revenue and profits for thermal generators, relative to a situation of no RET. 
Figure 7 compares profitability by generator type between these two scenarios. It shows that the net 
present value of profits to black and brown coal-fired generators are about 40 and 38 per cent lower 
with the RET. Conversely, profits for wind generators are higher with the RET in place. Electricity 
generators’ profits are also affected by the current over-supply of generation capacity, which is 
causing low wholesale prices. A substantial adjustment task lies ahead for the electricity sector, as 
older plant eventually exit the market, regardless of the level of the RET (section 3.1.2).   
Given their relatively high emissions intensity, it is difficult to imagine any effective policy to reduce 
greenhouse gases which had no impact on coal-fired generators. If the revenue impacts on 
incumbents were a primary concern for government, it could consider providing direct assistance, 
rather than weakening the policy causing the impacts. Two considerations argue against that course. 
First, the current owners of many large coal- and gas-fired power stations acquired the assets in full 
knowledge of the 41,000 GWh 2020 target—as many of these plants were purchased after plans to 
expand the RET were announced. The government published a paper on expanding and extending 
the RET in July 2008 (COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water 2008). Plans to 
introduce state-based renewable schemes, which would have had a comparable effect (and which 
the Commonwealth arrangements subsumed) were announced even earlier. Figure 8 lists thermal 
power stations with a capacity of 500 MW or more that were acquired or commissioned by private 
businesses from 2009 onwards. These assets represent 55 per cent of the total capacity of the 
largest power stations and 10 out of the 24 largest power stations by number. 
Second, the government has already given a total of $2 billion in carbon price compensation to the 
10 most emissions-intensive coal-fired generators by way of assistance with the impacts of a carbon 
price (Climate Change Authority calculation based on Clean Energy Regulator 2014b). The most 
emissions-intensive of these received about half a billion dollars each. The carbon price has since 
been repealed but generators are not obliged to repay this assistance. 
FIGURE 7 PROFIT BY GENERATOR TYPE WITH AND WITHOUT THE RET, 2015–2040 
 
Note: The without RET scenario assumes the RET ceases operation from 1 January 2015 and any mechanism used to 
compensate investments made under the RET, if one were introduced, does not affect wholesale or retail price outcomes (ACIL 
Allen 2014, p. ii). The with RET scenario assumes the current RET remains in place. ACIL Allen calculated profit measure as 
modelled pool revenues (energy and LGCs), less fixed operating and maintenance costs and variable generating costs.  
Source: Warburton review 2014, based on ACIL Allen 2014 
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FIGURE 8 LARGE FOSSIL FUEL POWER STATIONS ACQUIRED OR COMMISSIONED, 2009–2014  
 
Note: For the purposes of this analysis, large power stations are those over 500 MW capacity. Name of commissioning or 
purchasing entity in brackets. Analysis covers the period 2009–2014; purchases and commissions only occurred from 2011 
onwards. TPG purchased Alinta in 2011. Excludes plant purchased or commissioned by state-owned generators.  
Source: Climate Change Authority based on ACIL Allen 2014 and public announcements listed in References 
The Authority concludes that, in the absence of other policies, the RET remains the central policy 
instrument for reducing electricity sector emissions. The overall impacts on electricity consumers are 
modest and, where appropriate, best mitigated through the provision of targeted assistance to 
vulnerable households and electricity-intensive businesses. It is difficult to be persuaded that existing 
fossil-fuelled generators are being unfairly burdened by the RET’s impacts, given the timing of many 
purchase decisions and the payment of compensation for a carbon price that has since been 
withdrawn.  
CONCLUSION 
C 2. The Renewable Energy Target arrangements are currently the primary policy 
instruments for electricity sector decarbonisation, and no more cost-effective and 
scalable measures are in prospect at this time. Their overall impacts on electricity 
consumers are quite modest, and are mitigated through the provision of targeted 
assistance. 
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 CHAPTER 3. THE LARGE-SCALE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET 
This chapter considers the role of the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) in the 
current policy context, including the level of the LRET and exemptions for 
emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries.  
First, it examines whether the current 2020 LRET target remains feasible, and the best 
course of action if this is not the case. It concludes that there is no case to reduce the target, 
but there is a case for deferring the current 2020 LRET target, for example by up to three 
years, to provide additional time to ensure it can be met. 
Second, it considers the eligibility criteria for determining partial exemptions for 
trade-exposed businesses, concluding that present anomalies should not be extended in the 
event that assistance is expanded in the future.  
Finally, it explores the role of the LRET post-2020 and recommends the government 
consider, in the absence of more comprehensive policies, an expanded role for the LRET 
after 2020 capable of delivering substantial decarbonisation in the electricity sector. 
 
3.1. FEASIBILITY OF THE CURRENT LARGE-SCALE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TARGET 
Given the repeal of the carbon price, and doubts about the capacity of the Emissions Reduction 
Fund and safeguard mechanism to drive necessary emissions reductions in the electricity sector, the 
LRET will likely be called upon to play a greater role in the decarbonisation of Australia's electricity 
sector out to 2020 and beyond.  
In its 2012 RET review, the Authority considered the feasibility of the 2020 target and concluded that 
the target was challenging but achievable provided that a price on carbon remained. Since that time 
several developments have occurred which have undermined investor confidence in this sector and 
raised doubts about the feasibility of achieving the LRET in 2020. In particular, the erosion of 
bipartisan support for the target and the prospect of major changes has seen investment in 
large-scale renewable projects in 2014 fall to levels not seen since 2002 (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance 2014, p. 1).  
In light of these developments, the Authority has considered: 
• whether the current 2020 target is still ‘technically feasible’ (that is, can the required new 
capacity be built) 
• whether it is still 'financially feasible' (that is, will it be financed) 
• how might the current LRET target be modified if there are reasonable doubts about its 
achievability. 
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3.1.1. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY 
The first question around the feasibility of any 2020 target is whether it is physically possible to meet. 
Recent estimates put the amount of new large-scale renewable capacity required to meet the full 
41,000 GWh target by 2020 at just below 9,000 MW (Warburton review 2014, p. 29). Meeting this 
target would require sustaining higher build rates than Australia has achieved to date. Assuming 
relatively small amounts of construction in 2015, it would require an average annual build rate of 
about 1,800 MW over 2016–2020, almost three times the highest annual rate to date of 655 MW 
(Climate Change Authority calculation from Clean Energy Council 2014, p. 6). 
One aspect of the feasibility of achieving the target is whether inputs such as steel, components and 
construction equipment can be obtained. In recent work commissioned by the Clean Energy Council, 
ROAM Consulting investigated the technical feasibility of meeting the 2020 target by conducting 
interviews with industry experts (ROAM Consulting 2014, pp. 8–10). ROAM found there are no 
physical constraints to meeting the target, with sufficient raw materials, components, labour and 
construction equipment available either domestically or (for some materials) overseas. Overall, and 
despite the higher build rates required, ROAM concluded that it would be technically possible to build 
the capacity required to meet the current 2020 target.  
A second part of technical feasibility is whether there are enough potential projects sufficiently far 
advanced that they could be constructed if current investor uncertainties were resolved. Table 3 
provides an estimate of the pipeline of new renewable projects by project status. The pipeline 
consists of about 16,100 MW of wind farm projects and 1,700 MW of large-scale solar projects. 
About 7,700 MW of the total already has planning approval.  
While it is difficult to be certain given the compressed timeframes to 2020, there would appear to be 
an adequate project pipeline and availability of inputs for the current 2020 target to still be considered 
technically feasible.    
TABLE 3 LARGE-SCALE RENEWABLES PROJECT PIPELINE 
PROJECT STATUS  CAPACITY 
(MW) 
Undergoing approvals 10,050 
Approvals finished, but other issues require resolution before financial close 1,600 
Ready to build in 2015–16 pending financial close 5,650 
Committed 500 
Total 17,800 
Notes: Clean Energy Regulator (CER) information compiled from the Bureau of Resource and Energy Economics' Electricity 
Generation Major Projects Database and Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO’s) operation planning database, 
complemented with interviews conducted with project proponents. The CER has not independently substantiated all information 
provided in these interviews. Information provided represents status at May 2014. 
Source: Information provided by the CER to the Climate Change Authority 
3.1.2. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY 
For the LRET to remain financially feasible:  
• the combination of the wholesale electricity and Large-scale Generation Certificate (LGC) prices 
must cover the costs of renewable generation  
• the LGC price must not exceed the penalty price under the scheme (the 'shortfall charge')  
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• finance would need to be available to fund the necessary new large-scale renewable energy 
projects.  
At present, both wholesale electricity market and LGC prices are low, discouraging investment in 
new renewable capacity. 
LGCs cover the gap between the costs of renewable and fossil fuel generation. Other things being 
equal, lower wholesale electricity market prices mean renewable generators need to earn more 
revenue from LGCs. If, for example, a wind project required about $90/MWh to be commercially 
viable, with a wholesale electricity price of about $35/MWh, it would need an LGC price of about $55. 
If the price of LGCs exceeds the shortfall charge, liable parties will probably choose to meet their 
liabilities by paying the charge, rather than purchasing renewable generation, with costs passed 
through to electricity consumers. 
Current low LGC prices are heavily influenced by uncertainty about the future of the LRET. Even if 
Parliament reaches a conclusion soon, it could take some time for investor confidence to return, 
increasing the cost and reducing the likelihood of investors financing the new renewables required to 
meet any 2020 target.  
The rest of this section discusses the financial feasibility of the target in more detail. It covers views 
and analysis on meeting the existing 2020 target, the causes and implications of low wholesale and 
LGC prices, and the potential availability of finance for new generation. 
The current 2020 target and the shortfall charge 
In submissions to the Warburton review,1 participants expressed conflicting views about whether the 
existing target can be met without triggering the shortfall charge. 
If a liable entity does not surrender the number of certificates required under the LRET or the SRES, 
a shortfall charge applies to the outstanding amount. The shortfall charge for both the LRET and 
SRES is a nominal price of $65/MWh. Costs incurred by purchasing certificates are tax-deductible, 
while the payment of the shortfall charge is not. Liable parties could therefore purchase certificates at 
a higher price (a tax effective price of about $93/MWh, assuming a company tax rate of 30 per cent), 
before they were financially worse off than paying the shortfall charge (assuming the company is in a 
tax-paying position). If the LGC price exceeds the shortfall charge, then liable entities will probably 
choose to pay the shortfall charge, so the amount of renewable energy for that year would be below 
the target level. Because the shortfall charge is not indexed, its value falls over time in real terms. By 
2020, the tax-effective shortfall charge is estimated to be worth $79/MWh in today's dollars (ROAM 
Consulting 2014, p. 19).2 
Infigen submitted that there are sufficient large-scale renewable projects in the pipeline to reach the 
required capacity, provided regulatory certainty is restored. The Clean Energy Council agreed, citing 
its commissioned modelling from ROAM. Box 2 provides an overview of the different modelling 
exercises conducted on the RET.  
Some participants, including the Australian Industry Group (AiG) and Origin Energy, noted that the 
2020 target is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve, with AiG citing the uncertain political 
environment as a key factor. 
Other participants, including AGL, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), Energy 
Australia and the Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA), stated that the target can no longer 
be achieved without triggering the shortfall charge. Energy Australia argued that the rapid build rate 
and suppressed wholesale prices would render new projects uneconomic. The AEMC cited 
modelling by Frontier Economics that indicated the target would not be met due to low wholesale 
1 Quotations are taken from participants' submissions to both the Warburton and Climate Change Authority reviews as indicated. 
For a list of submissions to the Authority review see Appendix A. 
2 In this chapter, all currency amounts are in real 2014 Australian dollars unless otherwise specified. 
32 | REPORT: 2014 RET REVIEW 
                                                          
 
prices, low demand growth and repeal of the carbon price (Frontier Economics 2014, pp. 28–9). AGL 
stated that: 
At current LGC and wholesale electricity market prices, new investments in renewable 
energy projects cannot be justified economically. Given the market based policy 
mechanism of the RET and the energy-only market design of the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) in particular, it is inconceivable that the investment in renewable projects 
required to meet the LRET will be forthcoming, particularly against the backdrop of the 
manifest uncertainty in relation to broader energy policy.  (AGL, Warburton review 
submission, p. 1) 
Modelling commissioned for the Warburton review projected that the 2020 target could be met 
without the LGC price exceeding the shortfall charge (ACIL Allen 2014, p. 14). This and other 
commissioned modelling provides information about whether the current target would be met under a 
situation in which projects are built relatively steadily to meet the current targets. This means that it is 
less informative about a situation in which the regulatory uncertainty to date, or further lengthy delays 
in reaching a political agreement on the RET reduce investment in renewables over the next year or 
so.  
Large-scale Generation Certificate prices 
To ensure any LRET target is met through renewable generation, rather than retailers paying 
penalties, LGC prices should not exceed the shortfall charge, but they should be sufficient, in 
combination with expected wholesale prices, to cover the costs of new renewable generation. At 
present, LGC prices are low for two main reasons:  
• a surplus of certificates created by small-scale solar PV (these were created before the RET was 
split into the LRET and SRES)  
• expectations of future cuts to the 2020 target.  
Accounting for 2013 surrenders, there are currently about 26 million surplus LGCs (ACIL Allen 
2014, p. 14), suppressing prices and making it more difficult for projects to reach financial close. The 
Investor Group on Climate Change (IGCC) commented on the effect of this LGC oversupply in its 
submission to the Warburton review: 
We understand that energy suppliers have sufficient accumulated [LGCs] such that they 
would not need to enter the market to purchase additional [LGCs] for some time. For 
example, AGL indicated in 2013 that they had sufficient supply of [LGCs] for 5 years of 
obligations under the scheme. If as a result of weakening the RET, there is still a surplus 
of [LGCs] in the market for some years, further new build of assets may be delayed as a 
result of depressed LGC prices. (IGCC, Warburton review submission, p. 7) 
More important, however, is that current low LGC prices principally reflect the view of likely cuts to 
the current 2020 target. In a recent paper, Nelson et al. noted: 
Firms expect the target to be altered, and so LGC prices have softened and investment 
has hence been delayed. Now such little time is left to meet the target that policy makers 
will almost certainly as a minimum vary the target to avoid manifest policy failure or 
abandon the existing policy altogether, producing a second wave of dynamic 
inconsistency. (Nelson et al. 2014, p. 2) 
The CER estimates that the volume-weighted average market price for an LGC will be about $30 in 
2015 (CER 2014), with this forward price reflecting anticipated cuts to the LRET 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia (PwC) 2014, p. 8). This, in combination with current low 
wholesale prices, is significantly below required returns for new wind projects of at least $80/MWh 
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2013, p. 1). 
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 BOX 2 COMPARING COMMISSIONED MODELLING OF THE RET 
Almost a dozen modelling exercises have been conducted on the RET in recent years. While there are 
differences in approach and input assumptions, they are more notable for their overall similarity than their 
differences. For previous RET reviews, Warburton (2014) and the Authority (2012) commissioned modelling 
from ACIL Allen and SKM MMA, respectively. Other exercises include: 
• Deloitte Access Economics (commissioned by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the 
Business Council of Australia and the Minerals Council of Australia, 2014) 
• Frontier Economics (commissioned by AEMC, 2014) 
• Jacobs (commissioned by the Climate Institute, World Wildlife Fund and the Australian Conservation 
Foundation, 2014) 
• Oakley Greenwood (commissioned by ESAA, 2014) 
• ROAM Consulting (commissioned by the Clean Energy Council, 2014) 
• Schneider (2014).  
Some of these modelling exercises indicate that the current 2020 target can be met without exceeding the 
shortfall charge; others indicate that the shortfall charge is triggered before the target is met. In general, the 
different modelling exercises indicate that, other things being equal, lower electricity demand, higher 
renewable technology costs and lower gas prices reduce the likelihood of the target being met. Frontier 
Economics' modelling, incorporating all of these assumptions, is the only one of these exercises finding that 
not even a ‘real’ 20 per cent target (that is, a target based on 20 per cent of current estimated demand in 2020) 
could be met.  
All exercises show that reducing the LRET improves revenue for fossil fuel generators and that overall impacts 
on retail electricity prices are modest. Some project retail prices would be slightly lower, and some slightly 
higher with the abolition of LRET: 
• ACIL Allen modelling projects that if the RET is repealed, households would be no better or worse off in the 
period to 2030 (ACIL Allen 2014, p. 32).  
• Deloitte estimates that repeal of the RET would reduce the household bills on average by around $49 per year 
(Deloitte 2014, p. 19). This represents three per cent of a typical household bill of around $1,400. 
• Jacobs estimates that repeal of the RET would increase electricity prices by between 2.1 and 8.3 per cent over 
the period to 2030 (Jacobs 2014, p. 27). 
Some participants have questioned the technology cost and carbon pricing assumptions of the ACIL Allen 
modelling conducted for the Warburton review. The assumptions, sources and results from ACIL Allen's 
modelling are generally similar to those from the Authority's 2012 commissioned modelling:  
• Electricity demand—both are based on the Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO’s) medium growth 
forecasts for demand in the National Electricity Market (NEM). Since 2012 the projected demand for electricity 
in the National Electricity Market in 2020 has declined by about 16 per cent (Climate Change Authority 
calculation from AEMO 2012 and 2014a). 
• Technology costs—both are based on the Australian Energy Technology Assessment published by the Bureau 
of Resource and Energy Economics. 
• Gas prices—both forecast the gas price to reach around $9 per gigajoule by 2020. 
One area of difference is the 'below baseline' generation for 'pre-existing' generators (largely hydro 
generators). As described in Box 1, the magnitude of output below baseline levels from pre-existing generators 
is important when determining how much additional renewable energy is required to meet a 'real' 20 per cent 
target (if that were a policy goal). In general, higher output from pre-existing generators means that a smaller 
amount of additional renewable generation is required to meet a given overall share of renewables. In 2012, 
the Authority estimated 2020 generation from these sources of about 14,300 GWh, whereas in 2014 ACIL 
Allen estimated output from pre-existing generators of about 16,000 GWh. Actual long-run output will depend 
on rainfall levels, which can affect the output of hydro generators. 
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Wholesale electricity prices 
Low current and expected future wholesale prices, caused largely by excess capacity in the 
electricity market, are also making it harder to invest in large-scale renewable energy projects, given 
current low LGC prices. 
While the RET is certainly adding capacity, it is neither the sole nor primary cause of oversupply. 
Other drivers include weakening demand for electricity and barriers and disincentives to exit for 
incumbent, ageing generators. Reasons why even very old plant might not be exiting now include: 
• The bulk of capital costs are sunk, and operating costs of most plants are quite low—so as long 
as revenues exceed operating costs, plants are likely to keep running.  
• 'First-mover disadvantage'—generators that exit earlier make remaining generators (including 
their competitors) better off because reductions in supply increase wholesale market prices, 
other things being equal. 
• Uncovered site remediation costs—these are potentially very high for some generators and 
holdings of bonds intended to cover these costs may be inadequate, exposing firms to large 
liabilities should the site be closed (Nelson et al. 2014, pp. 15–16). 
• Uncertainty about the future policy environment—where investors perceive a possibility that 
generators could be paid to retire, they may continue to operate plant for longer than otherwise 
planned on the prospect they could be paid to close down.  
Potential options to address the oversupply of generating capacity include: 
• Let the market resolve the imbalance—allow the persistently low wholesale price to force 
generators from the market, particularly as large maintenance expenditure decisions fall due. 
There is some evidence this is starting to happen—in the NEM about 1,300 MW of mothballed 
generation has recently been or is soon to be permanently retired. About 1,150 MW remains 
mothballed and more mothballing is planned for the future (Climate Change Authority based on 
AEMO 2013; AEMO 2014b).  
• Industry-supported plant closure—an ongoing revenue stream is provided by the electricity 
supply industry (which, in turn, would presumably be funded by electricity consumers) to fund 
the permanent closure of excess generation capacity. 
• Taxpayer funding of plant closure. 
• Direct regulation—for example, power stations could be required to close once they reach a 
certain age (Nelson et al. 2014, pp. 19–22). 
Selecting the right response is a very important issue for electricity consumers and the electricity 
supply industry. The retirement of some existing fossil fuel capacity would certainly make it easier to 
invest in new renewables or any other type of low-emissions plant. Ultimately, these new 
investments are essential if Australia is to transition to a low-emissions economy. 
Detailed consideration of the appropriateness of government intervention to deal with excess supply 
is beyond the scope of this review. The Authority observes, however, that there would be significant 
equity and precedent issues associated with options that require other parties paying to meet the 
remediation obligations that properly belong to generators. The Authority also notes that closing a 
small number of coal-fired power stations would have a limited impact on Australia's emissions in the 
short term, to the extent that the lost output was replaced by increased output from other coal-fired 
power stations. 
The Authority’s concerns about equity issues are shared across state and federal governments. In 
December 2014, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Energy Council stated (p.1) that it 
does not support assistance to generators to exit the market and ‘opposes the transferral of the costs 
of retiring assets onto consumers or taxpayers’. The Council will consider whether there are any 
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material barriers to orderly exit and task AEMO with further work on pathways to ensure the exit of 
generators does not create risks for electricity system security. 
Availability and cost of finance for new renewable generation 
A critical issue in determining the overall feasibility of meeting the LRET is whether prospective new 
projects will be able to secure the necessary finance.  
To date, investment in new renewable generation to meet the RET has often, but not always, been 
based on power purchase agreements (PPAs). PPAs are long-term agreements between a 
renewable energy generator and an electricity retailer with obligations to surrender LGCs. The 
retailer typically agrees to purchase all electricity generated, with pricing for the LGCs and electricity 
covering the cost of the renewable investment. A PPA assists the renewable energy project in 
obtaining finance for construction, because potential investors know that it has a guaranteed price for 
its output. Retailers can benefit by contracting access to the LGCs required to meet their LRET 
liability, shielding themselves from unexpected increases in future LGC spot market prices.   
For a renewable energy project, the alternative to signing a PPA is to be a ‘merchant’ generator. 
Merchant generators can rely on spot prices for both electricity and LGCs—or can hedge against 
future uncertainties through short-term forward contracts. The lack of a guaranteed price for their 
output increases the risk relative to a generator with a PPA, which is reflected in higher risk 
premiums for finance. 
As part of this review, the Authority held bilateral meetings with a number of banks and equity 
investors to better understand the conditions under which investment in new large-scale renewable 
energy projects would be commercially feasible. Taking these discussions into account, as well as 
evidence presented in submissions, the Authority concludes that: 
• Bipartisan support is critical. Agreement between the two major political parties on the level 
and timing of the LRET would restore confidence to make investments in new capacity. Many 
stakeholders have highlighted the need for this commitment to unequivocal, even in the face of 
continued lobbying for the target to be cut. Given the extent of uncertainty and disruption caused 
by the recent period of policy uncertainty, investor confidence may take some time to return. 
• Surplus LGCs are suppressing prices and making it more difficult to invest. This suggests 
that if changes are made to the level or timing of the annual targets, then the targets to 2017 
should not be altered, to assist with running down the surplus. 
• Sufficient generation to meet the target is unlikely to be financed without arrangements 
such as PPAs that provide certainty about future revenue streams. Given the suppressed 
wholesale price and uncertain outlook for electricity demand, PPAs (or mechanisms that provide 
similar certainty) are important for investors (PwC 2014). While investments can be made on a 
merchant basis, the increased risk raises the costs of finance, which will likely make some 
potential projects uneconomic. 
• The current scheme end date of 2030 will likely curtail the volume of projects that are 
financially feasible. The IGCC noted that investors typically need 12, and preferably 15 years, 
of LGC revenue for a project to be commercially viable. Given the time required for investors to 
regain confidence, project developments may only begin in earnest from 2016 or 2017; even if 
developments started again in 2015 new projects would not be operational until 2017 at the 
earliest. The short remaining period for LGC creation would mean recovering costs from fewer 
certificates, potentially causing the required LGC price to rise above the shortfall charge. An 
extension of the scheme's horizon would reduce the certificate prices required to raise the same 
project revenues.   
• Frequent reviews of the LRET create uncertainty which discourages investment in the 
sector. Investors suggested that legislated reviews should be removed altogether, or 
undertaken less frequently (see chapter 5). 
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In the near term, the Authority's view is that there is no difficulty in meeting annual targets under the 
LRET, because of the large overhang of LGCs and the gentle increase in the annual target levels. 
From 2017 to 2020, however, the annual targets increase steeply from 25,181 GWh to 41,000 GWh 
(Figure 9). This sharp increase, in combination with the current market conditions and political 
uncertainty, could make meeting the target too challenging a task, even if an early bipartisan 
agreement on the LRET were reached. Options for dealing with this situation are discussed in the 
following sections. 
FIGURE 9 ANNUAL LRET TARGETS 2001–2030 
 
Notes: Targets from 2001–2010 are for the RET as a whole. Annual targets exclude allowance for waste coal mine gas 
generation. Since 2011 the RET has operated as the SRES and LRET; as part of the split the targets were re-phased to reduce 
the number of excess certificates. This included increasing the 2012 and 2013 targets, and slightly reducing the targets from 
2016–18 to balance the adjustment. 
Source: Warburton review 2014 
 
3.2. CASE FOR ADJUSTING THE LARGE-SCALE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TARGET 
3.2.1. LEVEL OF THE 2020 TARGET 
In 2012, the Authority considered arguments for changing the level of the LRET. At the time, the 
Authority considered that, on balance, the level of the target should not be changed. This judgement 
was largely based on providing stability, predictability and investor confidence for the LRET and 
climate policy more broadly. 
Since then, the risk of the LRET not being met has increased significantly. If liable parties meet their 
RET obligations by paying penalties rather than surrendering certificates, this increases consumer 
electricity prices for no environmental benefit. This is a situation to be avoided. Not only would it 
impose costs on consumers, but it could undermine public confidence in climate policies and erode 
support for mitigation measures. 
In submissions to this review and the Warburton review, some participants, including incumbent 
generators and emissions-intensive businesses, argued that the target should be reduced to a 'real' 
20 per cent target (that is, one based on 20 per cent of either current estimated or actual electricity 
demand in 2020) or be abolished completely. Four main reasons were advanced—the LRET does 
not represent low-cost emissions reductions, the difficulty of meeting the current target, the 
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oversupply of capacity in the market and the LRET’s large impact on trade-exposed industries. 
Stanwell, for example, submitted: 
Stanwell supports efficient, industry wide approaches to emissions abatement at least 
cost to the Australian economy. The current RET does not meet this criteria. (Stanwell, 
submission to the Climate Change Authority, p. 1) 
Other participants, largely renewable energy proponents and non-government organisations, argued 
that substantial investment and planning had occurred based on the current target, and that its level 
should be maintained. WWF Australia noted: 
The RET has … mobilised national and international investment and built a strong 
domestic renewable energy industry which will be important to Australia’s future 
economic prosperity. The renewable energy target has mobilised around $20 billion in 
investment to date and will generate nearly $15 billion more by 2020 under the current 
target. Reducing the RET would threaten these investments and harm Australia’s 
reputation as a reliable investment destination. (WWF Australia, submission to the 
Climate Change Authority, p. 2) 
The modelling conducted for the Warburton review indicates that reducing the target to a 'real' 
20 per cent target (25,500 GWh in the ACIL Allen modelling) would: 
• Reduce the amount of new large-scale renewable capacity built between 2014–2020 from about 
8,200 MW to 3,200 MW (a reduction of about 60 per cent). 
• Reduce the LGC price in 2014 by about $14, which is 26 per cent lower than with the current 
RET. LGC prices would be consistently more than 10 per cent lower to 2030. 
• Improve coal-fired generators' aggregate profits to 2030 by about $9.3 billion in NPV terms 
($6.6 billion for black coal; $2.7 billion for brown coal).  
• Reduce investment in the renewables sector from about $14 billion to around $6 billion over the 
period to 2030. 
• Lower household bills slightly to 2020, then increase them slightly to 2030, resulting in a 
cumulative increase of $118 over 2015–2030 in NPV terms. 
• Increase cumulative emissions by 39  Mt CO2-e over the period 2015–20 and 190 Mt CO2-e over 
the period 2015–30 (ACIL Allen 2014, pp. 40–50; Warburton review 2014, pp. 51–2). 
Many participants acknowledged the need to make provisions for existing projects in the event the 
target is cut. The Business Council of Australia (BCA) noted: 
Recognising that investments have now been made under the scheme, the scheme 
cannot be scrapped without stranding assets and creating issues of sovereign risk. 
Therefore, any amendments to the RET should seek to not adversely affect investments 
that have already been made and should be mindful of their impact on investments 
currently being planned or already subject to approval. (BCA, Warburton review 
submission, p. 15) 
The design and implementation of appropriate transitional assistance for existing projects would not 
be straightforward. Providing standardised assistance by fixing an LGC price would likely lead to 
windfall gains or losses for individual projects. Project-specific measures would avoid this problem, 
but implementation would be more complex. For example, criteria would need to be established for 
assessing what were reasonable expectations of the LGC price on commencement of a project and 
who bore the risk for a reduction in the price under each contract. In addition, providing transitional 
assistance to existing projects raises the costs of any weakening of the LRET targets. These costs 
are likely to be borne ultimately by electricity consumers or taxpayers. 
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Any sizeable reduction in the target would also retard the decarbonisation of Australia’s electricity 
sector. As outlined in section 2.4, the electricity sector will play an important role in Australia's 
transition to a low-emitting economy. Cuts to the RET now would require more rapid emissions 
reductions in the sector later, and more reductions to be made up from elsewhere to meet Australia’s 
2020 target. At this time, there is no evidence that emissions reductions of the scale required from 
the electricity supply sector could be obtained more cheaply through the ERF.  
The importance of the RET in reducing Australia's emissions was noted by some stakeholders, 
including AiG: 
If the RET were removed or significantly scaled back, there would be a much larger gap 
between likely emissions and Australia’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to at least five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020. The cost and difficulty of 
bridging this gap through other policies could be significant, particularly if low-cost 
international abatement options are excluded. (AiG, Warburton review submission, p. 4) 
It should be noted that the RET was always intended to deliver ‘at least 20 per cent’ renewables and 
had the goal of subsuming the existing and planned state-based targets that existed when it was 
developed (Explanatory Memorandum, REE Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth)).  
In the Authority’s view, the changed circumstances since its last review do not warrant a reduction in 
the target. In particular, there is no compelling justification for reducing the target to a level 
representing 20 per cent of an updated electricity demand forecast for 2020. There is no reason to 
think that 20 per cent is the ‘right’ amount of renewable energy. As noted above, a significant 
reduction in the target would not decrease consumer prices and would not provide a satisfactory 
solution to the current oversupply problem. It would, however, defer investment in renewable 
generation, leading to higher electricity sector emissions, making it harder for Australia to achieve the 
deeper emissions reductions required beyond 2020. While modelling indicates that maintaining the 
current target level reduces fossil fuel generators' profits, it is likely that any effective mitigation policy 
will have this kind of effect. The next section considers the Authority’s preferred option for adjusting 
the LRET.  
3.2.2. RESCHEDULING THE LRET TARGETS 
The current target of 41,000 GWh of renewable energy in 2020 is looking increasingly challenging to 
achieve. Rather than cutting the 2020 target, the Authority suggests that consideration be given to 
extending the end year for achieving the target. This could help to restore confidence in the scheme, 
and provide the industry with some 'breathing space' to resume building the required capacity, 
following the disruptions of recent years. It would also provide some extra time for incumbent 
generators to adjust to further falls in projected electricity demand in 2020—for example, projected 
demand for electricity in the NEM in 2020 has declined by about 16 per cent since 2012. 
Figure 10 shows a proposed reschedule, which:  
• retains the current annual targets to 2017 to run down the present surplus of certificates  
• extends the end date for operation of the LRET by at least the same number of years as the 
41,000 GWh target is extended to ensure projects built later in the period have enough time to 
recoup the cost of their investments.  
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FIGURE 10 PROPOSED RE-PHASE FOR LRET TARGETS 
 
Source: Climate Change Authority 
Recent modelling of the LRET has not specifically analysed the effects of deferring the 41,000 GWh 
target. A few stakeholders have commented on the case for deferring the current 2020 LRET target. 
The Major Energy Users Association submitted that: 
The proposition by some liable parties to extend the transition period (to 41,000 GWh 
LRET) beyond 2020 while ramping up the target in the years between 2020 and 2030 
(e.g. the 30/30 proposition) suggests a reasoned compromise. It avoids the heavy 
short-term burden on industry and consumers, but provides ongoing signals for 
investment in renewable energy as demand grows and/or international agreements 
emerge. (Major Energy Users Association, Warburton review submission, p. 48) 
Schneider has modelled an LRET scenario where the targets are reshaped, with obligations reduced 
in the near term (to 2020) and added at the back end of the scheme (2020 to 2030), with overall 
obligations the same. This modelling suggests that deferring the target in this way would have a 
minimal impact on overall emissions (Schneider 2014, pp. 8–10). 
3.2.3. THE AUTHORITY'S VIEW 
On balance, the Authority considers it is better to extend the 2020 target and increase confidence it 
can be met, than to retain the target and miss it.  
Given the doubts about achieving the LRET target by 2020 discussed earlier—reflecting policy 
uncertainty and low investor confidence—this approach would seem to be a pragmatic basis for 
moving forward.  
A 'minimal change' approach would be to extend the targets by up to three years—and extend the 
end of the scheme by at least the same amount of time (Table 4). Any new LRET schedule should 
take account of the current LGC surplus, and leave targets to 2017 unchanged. The revised 
schedule should also take account of the time required for restoration of investor confidence and the 
physical construction of required capacity. 
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TABLE 4 ILLUSTRATIVE RE-PHASE OF THE 2020 LRET TARGET—TWO EXAMPLES 
 LRET Targets (GWh) 
Year Current 2-year extension 3-year extension 
2017 
25,181 25,181 25,181 
2018 29,781 28,345 27,818 
2019 34,381 31,509 30,454 
2020 41,000 34,672 33,091 
2021 41,000 37,836 35,727 
2022 41,000 41,000 38,364 
2023 41,000 41,000 41,000 
Ending 2030 2032 (at the earliest) 2033 (at the earliest) 
Note: The table provides illustrative examples of extending the target by two or three years and extending the scheme by at least 
the same amount of time. Given the large overhang of certificates, there is no case to reduce the annual targets until after 2017. 
Source: Climate Change Authority 
RECOMMENDATION 
R.1. Given the sharp decline in investor confidence, the resulting slowdown in investment, 
and the further reduction in projected electricity demand, the government should: 
• defer the 2020 target for the LRET by, say, up to three years and 
• extend the scheme as a whole by at least the same amount of time, with a view to 
providing sufficient time for projects to recover their costs. 
Given the large overhang of certificates, there is no case to reduce the annual targets 
until after 2017. 
 
3.3. EXEMPTIONS FOR EMISSIONS-INTENSIVE, TRADE-EXPOSED 
INDUSTRIES 
This section considers whether the current basis for assisting particular businesses with RET costs 
remains appropriate. 
Partial exemptions are provided for businesses undertaking emissions-intensive, trade-exposed 
(EITE) activities on the basis that RET costs reduce the competiveness of businesses competing in 
an international environment.  
The current RET partial exemption framework determines eligibility and assistance rates based on 
an activity's overall emissions intensity, regardless of the extent to which those emissions are related 
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to electricity use. Emissions intensity is determined using historical data and the exemption is only 
applicable to the portion of RET costs associated with expansion of the original 9,500 GWh MRET. 
Highly EITE activities are eligible to receive a 90 per cent exemption of their incremental RET costs, 
while moderately EITE activities are eligible for a 60 per cent exemption. In 2013, this translated to 
an exemption rate of about 75 per cent for highly EITE activities and about 50 per cent for 
moderately EITE activities (Warburton review 2014, p. 79).  
There is some (understandable) confusion between 'exemption' and 'liability' under the RET. Most 
EITE businesses are not liable entities. Liable entities under the RET are those that acquire 
electricity from the wholesale market or electricity direct from a generator—in practice, primarily 
electricity retailers. When EITE businesses receive assistance with RET costs, overall RET liabilities 
remain unchanged, so RET costs are passed through to a smaller set of non-exempt customers.  
Exemptions are provided through Partial Exemption Certificates issued by the CER to EITE 
businesses. The value of the exemption takes into account the assistance rate and a range of other 
inputs, including:  
• electricity use per unit of output for the activity—each activity has a specified industry average 
electricity baseline, the value of which is predetermined from historical data and is set in 
regulations  
• output—the quantity of relevant product is submitted to the CER by the EITE business every 
year 
• proportion of electricity use from a given site that incurs a RET liability.  
The Authority considered the assistance for EITE activities in its 2012 RET review, but did not form a 
conclusion. At the time, the carbon pricing mechanism included a similar assistance regime for the 
same activities, leading the Authority to recommend the Productivity Commission consider the issue 
as part of its broader review of carbon pricing assistance. With the repeal of the carbon price, the 
Authority has considered whether the eligibility criteria remain appropriate.  
Providing assistance based on emissions intensity, rather than electricity intensity, leads to some 
anomalies. Figure 11 shows the emissions intensities and electricity intensities of selected activities 
and the thresholds for assistance. Based on the current eligibility thresholds, some activities, such as 
lime and ammonium nitrate, are highly emissions-intensive, but not particularly electricity-intensive. 
These activities receive a high level of exemption from RET costs, despite having lower electricity 
intensities than some moderately emissions-intensive activities, such as tissue paper manufacturing.  
Providing assistance with electricity costs to businesses that are not particularly electricity intensive 
places a greater burden on non-exempt electricity users. In the Authority's view, any changes to 
assistance with RET costs should be based on need and the best measure of need in this context is 
electricity intensity. If broadening of assistance is considered, it should be based on electricity 
intensity. 
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FIGURE 11 EMISSIONS INTENSITY AND ELECTRICITY INTENSITY OF SELECTED ACTIVITIES 
ELIGIBLE FOR PARTIAL EXEMPTIONS FROM RET COSTS  
 
Note: The emissions intensity for each activity includes scope 2 (electricity) emissions, with 1 MWh of electricity use converted to 
1 tCO2-e. All numbers in this figure have been provided as midpoints of ranges to protect commercial confidentiality. The eligibility 
threshold for highly EITE activities is 2,000 tCO2-e/$ million revenue and for moderately EITE activities it is 1,000 tCO2-e/$ million 
revenue. (There are also thresholds based on tCO2-e/$ million value added; activities are eligible for assistance if they qualify 
under either metric.) Data was originally provided to the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency for the purpose of 
establishing the eligibility of EITE activities under the Jobs and Competiveness Program and Renewable Energy Target 
exemption scheme. Emissions data was provided for the financial years ending 2007 and 2008, and revenue data was provided 
for the financial year ending 2005 to the second half of 2008. 
Source: Climate Change Authority based on data provided by the Department of the Environment  
 
CONCLUSION 
C 3. If any further exemptions from electricity costs under the RET are to be granted, this 
should be on the basis of electricity intensity, rather than emissions intensity. 
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3.4. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET AFTER 2020  
Chapter 2 included comparisons of the projected emissions intensity of Australia's electricity supply 
in 2030 under low-emissions pathways with those under the current RET. This highlighted that more 
will need to be done beyond 2020 for Australia to follow a transition path consistent with global action 
to reduce the risks of dangerous climate change. This does not, of itself, necessarily mean that the 
RET should be maintained indefinitely, or increased or extended. Indeed, the Authority would like to 
see a more comprehensive approach to the electricity sector which would encourage all forms of 
zero- and low-emissions generation technologies, and discourage more emissions-intensive forms of 
generation, in a more cost-effective way than is attainable through the RET alone. That approach, 
however, seems some way off, and in the meanwhile further increases in and of RET targets 
post-2020 should be considered.  
As part of any consideration of increased and extended RET targets, eligibility for certificate creation 
should also be reconsidered. The RET might be modified, for example, to become a low-emissions 
target through the inclusion of other zero- or low-emissions technologies.  This could include waste 
coal-mine methane generation plants, plants burning industrial waste gases derived from fossil fuels, 
potentially coal or gas carbon capture and storage plant, and, if ever permitted by law, nuclear 
energy. Certificates created for non-zero-emissions plant could be discounted relative to 
zero-emissions plant.  
Consistent with the conclusions drawn in its 2012 RET review, the Authority believes that issues of 
investor confidence and regulatory risk remain highly relevant to investors in renewables and should 
be taken into account when considering future policy options.  
The Authority has recently been asked to conduct a special review under section 59 of the Climate 
Change Authority Act 2011 over the next 18 months. This will cover future national emissions 
reduction targets, emissions trading and other plausible measures relevant to Australia pursuing its 
post-2020 emissions reductions targets. Stakeholder views on policy options for the electricity sector 
will be sought as part of this review. 
RECOMMENDATION 
R.2. Over the longer term increased recourse to renewables in electricity generation is 
essential to Australia’s efforts to reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions. In the 
absence of effective alternatives, RET arrangements will have to carry much of this 
burden, so consideration should be given—at the appropriate time—to the nature 
and timeframe of possible RET arrangements in the post 2020 period. In particular, 
the government should consider increasing and extending targets, and expanding 
arrangements to cover a wider set of technologies.   
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 CHAPTER 4. THE SMALL-SCALE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SCHEME 
The SRES provides support for small-scale renewable technologies, including small-scale 
solar PV. Owners of eligible small-scale technologies receive tradeable certificates upfront 
for the amount of renewable electricity the system is 'deemed' to create over a given period, 
which they generally assign to the installer in exchange for a lower system price. 
Installations of solar PV have exceeded expectations and so far, about 1.3 million solar PV 
systems have been installed under the RET, producing about 3,800 GWh of electricity in 
2013. 
This chapter focuses on solar PV and considers whether the level of assistance provided 
under the SRES should be adjusted, and, if so, how. It considers the impacts of the SRES 
and whether the benefits achieved represent value for money for Australia as a whole.  
It concludes that subsidising PV under the SRES is a relatively expensive way of reducing 
emissions from the electricity sector, but does not see any strong case for urgent change, 
given that the overall costs are relatively modest and assistance will start phasing out from 
2017. If any changes are introduced, they should be gradual to avoid creating disruption in 
the sector.  
4.1. THE AUTHORITY'S 2012 CONCLUSIONS AND SUBSEQUENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
In its 2012 review (CCA 2012, p. 65), the Authority identified four potentially problematic issues with 
the design of the SRES, but did not recommend any fundamental changes. Those issues were:  
• the uncapped nature of the scheme means that the SRES can account for a relatively large 
share of total RET costs for consumers under certain circumstances 
• unlike the LRET, the subsidy provided to small-scale systems does not automatically reduce 
with falling technology costs, meaning that government intervention is required to reduce 
assistance rates 
• there was no legislated end date for the scheme (this has now changed) 
• paying for 15 years of generation upfront ('deeming') was unlikely to be justifiable for larger solar 
PV systems below the eligibility threshold of 100 kilowatts (kW).  
The Authority considered a number of options for addressing these issues, including recombining the 
SRES and LRET, and introducing certificate discounting that the Minister could initiate under 
pre-specified conditions. On balance, the Authority opted to propose modest adjustments to guard 
against possible booms and high costs, rather than any major and likely disruptive changes. 
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Specifically, the Authority recommended lowering the eligibility threshold for solar PV and adding an 
end date to the scheme; the second of these was accepted and the scheme will now end in 2030.  
At the time, the Authority noted that more disruptive options, such as recombining the LRET and 
SRES, might have been justified if the uptake of small-scale systems was expected to continue its 
strong growth. It found, however, that as the factors driving the boom—sharp falls in system costs, 
generous payments for exported electricity through state-based feed-in tariffs, and 'multiplier' credits 
for solar PV—were no longer present, and installations were expected to stabilise. This seems to be 
occurring—data from the Clean Energy Regulator (2014) shows that system installations in 2013 (the 
last year for which data are complete) were actually 44 per cent lower than their 2011 peak.  
That said, with the exception of the legislated end date, the design issues and consequent risks that 
the Authority identified in 2012 remain today. Data from the Australian PV Institute indicate that since 
2012, costs for PV modules and overall PV systems have continued to decline, albeit at slower rates 
(Figure 12). The average system size and the share of larger systems is rising (Figure 13); this 
increases the compliance costs of the SRES, other things being equal. Typical module prices fell 
from $1.50 per Watt in 2012 to $0.75 per Watt last year; installed prices for typical small residential 
systems dropped less rapidly, falling from $3 to about $2.50 per Watt. Very recently, there have been 
reports (see for example Edis 2014) that some suppliers have been offering prices as low as 
$1 per Watt for fully installed systems after SRES assistance, implying a total installed price of 
$1.60 per Watt.  
FIGURE 12 TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN PV SYSTEM COSTS, 2000–2013 
 
 
Note: Prices are prior to any assistance under the SRES and are in nominal dollars.  
Source: Climate Change Authority based on Australian PV Institute 2013  
Arguments for maintaining current levels of support have become less compelling with the decline in 
upfront costs. 
Stakeholder views on the SRES are polarised. Liable entities, large energy users, peak electricity 
and some business peak bodies favoured scaling back or phasing out assistance on the grounds 
that solar is now a cost-effective economic investment for households and no longer requires a 
subsidy. Other stakeholders involved in the small-scale market argued that the SRES should be 
retained in its current form because of the public benefits it creates. 
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FIGURE 13 SHARE OF INSTALLED PV CAPACITY BY SYSTEM SIZE, 2009–2014 
 
Note: 10 kW includes systems of 10–100 kW. 
Source: ACIL Allen 2014 
Submissions3 from the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, Business Council of Australia, and 
Energy Networks Association argued for abolition. Others supported an accelerated phase-out, 
suggesting a range of approaches including capping the scheme, reducing the length of deeming 
periods and applying a discount factor to certificates. AiG proposed regular and predictable 
adjustments using a formula that accounts for changes in the consumer cost of small-scale 
technologies and retail electricity prices. 
Stakeholders advocating the SRES be retained highlighted the impacts on the industry should the 
scheme be abolished, and argued that it has beneficial impacts on electricity prices and has driven 
improvements in industry standards and innovation. The Australian PV Institute, REC Agents 
Association, Yingli Solar and SunWiz argued that the growth of distributed PV reduced reliance on 
higher cost generators during extreme temperature events, helping suppress wholesale power 
prices. The Clean Energy Council (CEC), REC Agents Association, Australian Solar Council and 
Australian PV Institute argued that rooftop solar will also deliver future benefits by deferring upgrades 
to the electricity network.  
Many stakeholders in the industry pointed to the structure and wide geographical distribution of 
employment in small-scale renewables, and argued that abolishing the SRES would result in the loss 
of thousands of jobs. SunWiz argued that reducing or abolishing the SRES would increase upfront 
costs and payback periods for PV systems, and have a substantial impact upon their affordability and 
demand. The REC Agents Association pointed to the benefits of the SRES to the industry to date, 
arguing it has helped drive scale, resulting in lower costs through the industry supply chain and 
innovations in the marketing, delivery and installation of solar systems. The CEC argued that the 
SRES plays a vital role in ensuring high standards of quality assurance and safety within the industry 
because only PV systems designed and installed by accredited parties can access the SRES.  
3 References to submissions in this chapter are those made to the Authority if the organisation made a submission to the Authority 
(see Appendix A), otherwise references are to organisations’ submissions to the Warburton review.  
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Whether the level of assistance provided under the SRES should be adjusted and, if so, how, are 
reasonable questions to be asking.  Because assistance for PV systems is paid up-front, changing 
the level of assistance will have no effect on households who have already installed PV—there is no 
'stranded' asset risk for such households. Rapid step changes, however, could significantly disrupt 
installation businesses.  
In considering assistance under the SRES, the Authority has looked at: 
• the impacts of the SRES 
• whether the benefits achieved represent value for money for Australia as a whole 
• the need for a smooth transition if assistance were to be reduced, to avoid the risk of serious 
disruption in the installation industry. 
Two preliminary points should be noted. First, the discussion here should not be interpreted as 
relating to assistance for technologies other than solar PV. In this limited review, the Authority has 
confined its focus to solar PV because it makes up the overwhelming majority of certificate creation 
under SRES (over 90 per cent of certificates in 2013) (Climate Change Authority calculation from IES 
2014, p. 10). Modelling commissioned for the Warburton review suggests that this dominance will 
continue, with solar PV projected to make up 75 per cent of cumulative certificates created over 
2015–2030 (Climate Change Authority calculation from data underlying ACIL Allen 2014, p. 17).  
Second, this analysis focuses on household PV rather than larger, commercial-scale PV; time and 
resources have prevented the Authority from considering commercial-scale PV in this review; Box 3 
provides an overview of the issues.  
4.2. IMPACTS OF THE SRES  
Small-scale PV has private and wider social costs and benefits. In addition to the net private benefits 
for households, installation of small-scale PV has three sources of wider social impact:  
• emissions reductions associated with displacement of electricity from the grid 
• the 'network impacts' of PV installations on the broader systems that transmit and distribute 
electricity from generators to consumers 
• growth of the small-scale PV industry. 
4.2.1. HOUSEHOLD COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PV 
As with measures to improve household energy efficiency, barriers to the uptake of PV can include 
price or other factors, some of which SRES addresses through an upfront subsidy. Installing 
household solar PV has net financial benefits for households—the reduction in ongoing electricity 
bills from self-generation is likely to more than offset the upfront cost of installing a PV system. Net 
financial benefits would probably accrue even without the SRES, but by providing an upfront 
payment4 to households, the scheme lowers initial expenses and shortens the payback period. The 
upfront payment represents the amount of renewable energy the system is 'deemed' to create over a 
given time frame, and increases with system size and the ‘quality of the solar resource’ (that is, the 
sunniness of the broad location). This support will decrease from 2017 as the deeming period 
reduces by one year each year until the scheme ends in 2030.  
 
4 Technically, the SRES allows households who install solar PV to create tradeable certificates. In practice, the vast majority of 
households assign these certificates to the installer in exchange for a reduction in the installation price, hence the shorthand 
‘payment’. 
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 BOX 3 TREATMENT OF COMMERCIAL-SCALE PV IN THE RET 
In its 2012 review, the Authority noted the risk that future increases in installations of 
commercial-scale solar PV could increase the volume of STCs and therefore the costs of the 
uncapped SRES. The Authority recommended reducing the eligibility threshold for PV and 
that the government conduct further consultations to determine an appropriate threshold. 
Systems over the threshold would be incorporated in the LRET with five-year deeming. Earlier 
this year, the Warburton review made a similar recommendation, specifying an SRES 
eligibility limit of 10 kW (see Appendix C). 
Installed capacity of systems over 10 kW grew by an estimated 150 per cent over 2012–13, 
albeit from a very low base. Much of this growth was encouraged by grants from the 
now-discontinued Clean Technology Investment Program (Green Energy Markets 2014, 
p. 32). The Warburton review (2014, p. 74) notes the presence of barriers to uptake that would 
reduce the likelihood of a significant future boom in commercial-scale PV, such as the fact that 
industrial businesses pay lower electricity tariffs than households, and often rent their 
premises. 
That said, as the market for household solar PV becomes more saturated, PV suppliers will 
likely increase their efforts to target business customers, including through offering 
arrangements such as solar leasing that would lower some of these barriers. This entails 
some risk of a boom in these systems, which would cause a rapid increase in SRES costs. 
Both the renewable energy industry and the CER have raised concerns at the high 
compliance costs associated with shifting larger systems into the LRET. The Clean Energy 
Council (2014) reports that installing and checking the more sophisticated meters required 
would increase installation costs by several thousand dollars. The CER would experience very 
large increases in applications for accreditation.  
Moving larger systems into the LRET is but one approach to managing the risks to future 
SRES cost blowouts (and would require a solution to the high transaction costs problem to be 
viable). Other options are:  
• retaining commercial-scale PV in the SRES but issuing certificates more frequently (either 
fewer years of upfront deeming or at intervals in arrears)  
• retaining commercial-scale PV in the SRES with a more rapid phase-out of deeming.  
The Authority believes further consideration of the consequences of these options is 
warranted, but it has not been possible in the course of this review. 
 
The average upfront cost of installing a 3 kW solar system (a common system size) is estimated at 
about $7,670 in 2014 (Green Energy Markets 2014, p. 27). SRES payments cover about one-third of 
this cost; on average across states and territories, this lowers the simple payback period of a 3 kW 
system from 10 to about seven years (Warburton review 2014 p. 66). As the deeming period reduces 
in future, the absolute value of this upfront payment will fall by about $160 per year in nominal 
terms.5 
5 Climate Change Authority calculation based on an STC price of $38, a 3 kW system and solar zone data from Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), schedule 5. It is a simple average across solar zones that determine the volume of 
STCs deemed in one year to create an Australia-wide approximation. 
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In addition to net financial benefits, households also receive non-monetary benefits from installing 
PV. Many get satisfaction, for example, from reducing their reliance on energy retailers and feel that 
generating renewable energy at home is a 'practical' or direct way of contributing to Australia's 
emissions reduction task.  
The funds for the SRES subsidy are ultimately provided by electricity consumers as a whole. Liable 
parties under the RET—generally electricity retailers—have to surrender certificates created by 
renewable energy from small-scale technologies: retailers pass the costs of purchasing these 
certificates onto their customers. In 2014, SRES costs were estimated to make up 1.6 per cent of an 
average household electricity bill (ACIL Allen 2014, p. 24); SRES costs would represent a larger 
share of commercial bills because commercial users generally have lower electricity tariffs. 
4.2.2. SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PV 
Emissions reductions 
Generating electricity from solar PV displaces emissions-intensive grid electricity. So far, about 
1.3 million solar PV systems have been installed under the RET, producing about 3,800 GWh of 
generation in 2013 (Warburton review 2014 pp. 8,10). This total embraces all of the solar PV 
subsidised by the SRES, including systems that households would have installed in the absence of 
SRES. The emissions reductions properly attributable to policy depend on the number of ‘additional’ 
installations the SRES has encouraged.  
Assessing ‘additionality’ is difficult, given the judgments that have to be made about how many 
systems would be installed without SRES. Modelling by SKM MMA for the Authority's 2012 RET 
review, and by ACIL Allen for the Warburton review, provides two estimates of the additional systems 
that might be encouraged by the SRES in future: 
• ACIL Allen projected that about 2,800 MW of solar PV would be installed over 2015–2020 
without the SRES and 3,700 MW would be installed with the SRES in place; this suggests about 
one-quarter of projected installations to 2020 might be additional (Climate Change Authority 
calculation from data underlying Warburton review 2014, p. 69). ACIL also projects ‘additional’ 
emissions reductions of 15 Mt CO2-e over the period to 2030 (ACIL Allen 2014, p. 116).  
• SKM MMA projected about 3,400 MW of solar PV without the SRES and 3,500 with the SRES in 
place over 2012–13 to 2020–21, suggesting fewer than five per cent of installations would be 
additional (Climate Change Authority calculation from SKM MMA 2012). 
It is possible that the proportion of 'additional' systems encouraged by the SRES is falling over time. 
The lower the pre-subsidy upfront costs, the shorter the payback period, so, other things being equal, 
falls in upfront costs are likely to raise the share of uptake that would occur regardless of the policy.  
Impacts on the electricity network 
Different electricity consumers place different demands on the networks that transmit and distribute 
electricity. Air conditioning, for example, can impose heavy demands at peak times, increasing 
network costs. Solar PV can reduce a consumer’s demand on the network during peak times, but 
also uses the network to export generation surplus to the household’s requirements. Current 
approaches to network pricing do not accurately reflect the costs and benefits created by different 
consumers. As a result, network pricing can tend to over- or under-encourage the installation and 
use of technologies such as PV and air conditioning.   
The introduction of more cost-reflective network pricing is an important issue for the electricity sector. 
It is beyond the scope of this review, but is currently being addressed through other channels, such 
as Australian Energy Market Commission rule changes (AEMC 2014a). 
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Available estimates of the impact of PV on networks differ, but generally indicate that PV either 
imposes much smaller costs on other network customers than air conditioning does, or provides net 
benefits (NERA 2014, APVI 2013). A recent case study used modelled PV data to estimate that a 
household with a 2.5 kW north-facing PV system receives a reduction in their network charges that is 
approximately $120 per year greater than value of the reduction in network costs caused by the PV 
system. In contrast, a case study in respect of a large air conditioning unit found the additional 
network costs were approximately $680 per year more than the extra network charges paid by the 
household (NERA 2014 cited in AEMC 2014b, pp. 28–9). 
Impacts on the installation industry 
The final wider social impact of households' demand for PV is that businesses exist across Australia 
to satisfy it. Any changes to the level of assistance provided through the SRES would affect the 
owners and employees of these businesses and their suppliers. This is not directly relevant to the 
level of assistance provided under the SRES, but it does have implications for the manner in which 
any changes to the SRES are introduced. Sudden changes in government subsidies, for example, 
can have damaging effects on the owners and employees of businesses providing the subsidised 
good. The report of the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program details many examples 
of the impacts of such policy changes on the lives and wellbeing of business owners and staff, and 
was critical of how these issues were handled. It describes some of the impacts of that program's 
sudden termination in the following terms: 
… many businesses found themselves with an immediate freezing of their cash flow. As a 
result, many businesses had ongoing commitments to suppliers with forward orders that 
could not be met. Businesses were left with commitments on property leases, vehicles, 
equipment, and held insulation stock which could not be moved and no longer had any 
appreciable value. Some businesses had a liability to financial institutions, sold or 
disposed of vehicles, stock and equipment at a loss, or had to sell their family home to 
meet their business debts. (Hanger 2014, p. 287) 
This highlights the need for any changes to assistance arrangements under the SRES to be 
introduced in ways which avoid creating potential 'boom-bust' situations.   
4.3. SRES ASSISTANCE FOR SOLAR PV AND VALUE FOR MONEY 
There is at least a strong suggestion that the SRES may subsidise a reasonably large volume of 
installations that would occur anyway. Even when viewed in terms of the probable additional 
installations, it appears that reducing emissions by installing small-scale solar PV is a relatively 
expensive way to reduce emissions in the electricity sector.  
As discussed in section 2.2.3, the appropriate measure of the cost per tonne of emissions reductions 
is the incremental net present value of the resource cost divided by the incremental undiscounted 
emissions reductions delivered by the policy. Published estimates of the cost per tonne of emissions 
reductions from the SRES calculated in this way are very limited. ACIL Allen’s modelling for the 
Warburton review generated projections of about $95 per tonne of CO2-e over the period to 2030 for 
solar PV (in 2014 dollars; Warburton review 2014, p. 42). This modelling incorporates a levelised 
cost of energy (a measure of the cost of generating electricity from a technology that includes 
building and running costs) of about $190/MWh, which is about double the estimated levelised cost 
of wind (about $80–$100/MWh) (ACIL Allen 2014, p 115). Both estimates omit some avoided 
resource costs (see Box 4).  
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What is clear, however, is that the cost per tonne of emissions reductions from solar PV under the 
SRES is relatively expensive compared with: 
• the LRET, which is projected to create about 20 times the volume of additional emissions 
reductions at an average of about one-third of the unit cost over the period to 2030 (ACIL Allen 
2014, p. 116) and 
• with what the modelling commissioned by the Authority (Treasury and DIICCSRTE 2013) 
suggests might be required to achieve the minus 5 per cent 2020 target domestically through 
efficient policy (about $65 per tonne in 2020, in 2012 dollars).  
BOX 4 ESTIMATING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSISTING PV UNDER THE SRES 
The appropriate measure of the cost per tonne of emissions reductions is the incremental net 
present value of the resource cost divided by the incremental undiscounted emissions reductions 
delivered by the policy. Ideally, the incremental NPV of the resource should incorporate: 
• the incremental upfront costs of solar PV  
• its avoided resource costs, which can come about through both 
- reduced generation from large-scale plant  
- any (positive or negative) impacts on the electricity network.  
In practice, impacts on the electricity network are often excluded from these calculations for the RET, 
given they are difficult to estimate.  
ACIL Allen’s modelling estimates the cost per tonne of emissions reductions under the SRES at 
about $95 per tonne of CO2-e over the period to 2030 when compared with a no RET scenario 
(ACIL Allen 2014, p. 116). The modelling estimates the cost per tonne of emissions reductions from 
the RET as a whole, then apportions it between the LRET and SRES by calculating the 
cost per tonne for the SRES and assigning the remaining resource costs and avoided emissions to 
the LRET (Kelp 2014). The cost per tonne for the SRES is calculated as the incremental upfront 
costs of PV divided by the emissions displaced by the incremental PV installations. When compared 
with the 'ideal' approach outlined above, this omits some avoided resource costs. That said, the 
larger the share of PV that would be installed anyway, the smaller these incremental second-order 
effects would be.   
 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR PV UNDER THE SRES 
Overall, the Authority concludes that there is reasonable evidence that SRES support for small-scale 
PV is a relatively expensive way to reduce emissions from the electricity sector. At the same time, 
the cost impacts on electricity consumers generally are modest and the scheme is to start phasing 
out in 2017. This scheduled phase out could conceivably be accelerated while taking care to avoid 
serious disruption in the industry, by avoiding large ‘steps’ in the rate of deeming, which are likely to 
encourages rushes of installations before assistance rates change.  
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By way of illustration, a still smooth but slightly more rapid phase-out might involve reducing deeming 
by 1.5 or three years each year over 2015–2025 or 2015–2020, respectively. This would reduce 
compliance costs for electricity retailers, with possible modest flow-on savings to electricity users. 
Figure 14 illustrates these possibilities, and compares them with the current policy and the 
Warburton review's accelerated phase-out option (its other recommended option was immediate 
abolition). 
FIGURE 14  OPTIONS FOR AN ACCELERATED PHASE-OUT OF PV ASSISTANCE 
   
Source: Climate Change Authority based on Warburton review 
 
CONCLUSION 
C 4. Subsidising household PV under the SRES is a relatively expensive way to reduce 
emissions in the electricity sector. The Authority, however, has not recommended 
any changes, largely because the SRES assistance will shortly begin to phase 
out, and the overall costs are relatively modest. 
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 CHAPTER 5. OTHER ISSUES FOR THE REVIEW 
This chapter considers two issues—the diversity of access and uptake for renewable 
technologies under the RET, and the role and appropriate frequency for statutory reviews of 
the scheme. The first issue is a statutory requirement of the Authority's RET reviews.  
On both issues, the Authority is inclined to reiterate the conclusions made in its 2012 
reviews, namely that no change should be made to the RET to encourage particular 
technologies, and that statutory reviews should be conducted every four years rather than 
every two years. 
5.1. DIVERSITY OF ACCESS AND UPTAKE 
The Authority has a statutory obligation to review diversity of access of renewable technologies to 
the scheme.  
In its 2012 RET review, the Authority considered various measures that could be used to promote 
diversity of access and uptake, including: 
• Multipliers, which could be applied to certificates from particular technologies to increase their 
uptake.  
• A cap, which could be used to limit the total amount of generation from a particular technology, 
increasing the share of the target available to other eligible technologies.  
• Banding, which would set a quota for total generation from each eligible technology. By 
assigning particular targets to different technologies, banding allows each technology the space 
to evolve without potentially being 'crowded out' by other technologies that might be cheaper in 
the short term.  
The design of the LRET—which is neutral between renewable technologies—encourages the 
deployment of the lowest cost technologies, thereby minimising the costs to consumers of meeting a 
given target.  
In 2012, the Authority concluded that the adoption of any measure to promote diversity within the 
RET, such as expanding the use of multipliers, or introducing banding or caps, would increase the 
costs of the scheme to consumers, and to the community as a whole. The Authority's view remains 
that the present approach should continue and that the current level of diversity of access is 
appropriate at this time. As recommended in section 3.4, the question of access to the scheme would 
warrant further consideration in the event the LRET were to be increased and extended in the period 
beyond 2020.  
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 CONCLUSION 
C 5. No changes should be made to the Renewable Energy Target framework to promote 
diversity of renewable technologies at this time.  
 
5.2. FUTURE STATUTORY REVIEWS 
Currently, the REE Act requires the Authority to conduct reviews of the RET every two years. When 
the Authority considered the review schedule in 2012 it concluded that full reviews every four years 
would provide an appropriate balance between policy flexibility and investor certainty. This is a 
position shared with many stakeholders—in submissions to the Warburton review and the Authority, 
the vast majority of participants addressing this issue argued for less frequent reviews—or no 
statutory reviews at all. 
Statutory reviews that are transparent, predictable and principles-based are a valuable part of the 
governance of any major policy. In the context of the RET, they allow the tracking of progress 
towards nominated targets and evaluation of performance based on the goals of the scheme. They 
also allow actual and potential problems to be identified—and possible solutions to be explored in a 
formal (if stretched) timeframe. 
As recent experience has demonstrated, frequent reviews of the RET in an environment lacking 
bipartisan political support for the scheme can cause investment and employment in the renewables 
industry to stall and fall. The Authority looks forward to an early resolution of uncertainty surrounding 
the RET, and especially the 2020 LRET target. In that event, the level and timing of the re-negotiated 
2020 LRET target could be deemed to be outside the scope of future RET reviews.  
A likely major issue for consideration in the next statutory review (assuming this is in 2018) is the 
possible role of the RET in the period beyond 2020, including its place in the overall post-2020 policy 
framework. As noted earlier, in the absence of more comprehensive, cost-effective measures to 
reduce emissions in the electricity sector, consideration would need to be given to increasing and 
extending the RET targets post 2020, along with eligibility for certificate creation (see section 3.4).  
The Authority remains of the view that its previous suggestion that statutory reviews of the RET 
occur every four years strikes a reasonable balance between the need for policy flexibility and the 
risks to investor confidence created by too frequent reviews. 
CONCLUSION 
C 6. In the interest of maintaining investor confidence in the industry, the frequency of 
statutory reviews of the RET should be changed from every two years to every 
four years. For the same reason, if bipartisan agreement were to be reached on 
any revisions to the current 2020 LRET target, those revised arrangements should 
be outside the scope of future reviews.  
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 APPENDIX A PUBLIC CONSULTATION 
The Authority is required to conduct public consultation for all of its reviews. Given the limited time 
available to conduct the review, the Authority did not release an issues paper or draft report. 
Nevertheless, throughout the review, the Authority consulted with a wide range of interested parties, 
including energy retailers, energy users, investors and the renewable energy industry. The Authority 
also drew on its previous work as well as the public submissions, analysis (including modelling) and 
report of the recent Warburton review.  
Stakeholders were also invited to provide submissions to the Authority. Table 5 lists the individuals 
and organisations that provided submissions. These are available on the Authority’s website at: 
www.climatechangeauthority.gov.au/submissions/submissions-received. 
TABLE 5 SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED  
  
AGL Alstom 
Australian Financial Markets Association Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration 
Association 
Australian Sugar Milling Council  Barbara J. Fraser  
Clean Energy Council  CWP Renewables  
Energy Networks Association  Energy Supply Association of Australia  
Hydro Tasmania  Minerals Council of Australia  
Origin Energy  Peter Cook  
Recurrent Energy  Senvion Australia  
Stanwell Corporation  Trustpower  
WWF Australia   
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 APPENDIX B REQUIREMENTS FOR 
AUTHORITY RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TARGET REVIEWS 
The Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (the CCA Act) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 
2000 (Cth) (the REE Act) establish the legislative requirements for the Authority's RET review. 
Together, they cover requirements for timing, scope and conduct of the reviews. The relevant parts 
of both of these Acts are reproduced below:  
• Section 12 of the CCA Act sets out general principles that the Authority must have regard to in 
conducting reviews. 
• Section 162 of the REE Act sets out the Authority’s specific requirements for reviewing the RET. 
The Authority's principles (section 12 of the CCA Act)  
In performing its functions, the Authority must have regard to the following principles: 
(a) the principle that any measures to respond to climate change should: 
• be economically efficient; and 
• be environmentally effective; and 
• be equitable; and 
• be in the public interest; and 
• take account of the impact on households, business, workers and communities; and 
• support the development of an effective global response to climate change; and 
• be consistent with Australia’s foreign policy and trade objectives; 
(b) such other principles (if any) as the Authority considers relevant. 
Periodic reviews of operation of renewable energy legislation (section 162 of the REE Act) 
(1) The Climate Change Authority must conduct reviews of the following: 
(a) the operation of this Act and the scheme constituted by this Act; 
(b) the operation of the regulations; 
(c) the operation of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Large-scale Generation Shortfall Charge) Act 
2000; 
(d) the operation of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) 
Act 2010; 
(e) the diversity of renewable energy access to the scheme constituted by this Act, to be considered 
with reference to a cost benefit analysis of the environmental and economic impact of that access. 
Public consultation 
(2) In conducting a review, the Climate Change Authority must make provision for public 
consultation. 
Report 
(3) The Climate Change Authority must: 
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(a) give the Minister a report of the review; and 
(b) as soon as practicable after giving the report to the Minister, publish the report on the Climate 
Change Authority’s website. 
(4) The Minister must cause copies of a report under subsection (3) to be tabled in each House of 
the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the review is completed. 
First review 
(5) The first review under subsection (1) must be completed before the end of 31 December 2012. 
Subsequent reviews 
(6) Each subsequent review under subsection (1) must be completed within 2 years after the 
deadline for completion of the previous review. 
(7) For the purposes of subsections (4), (5) and (6), a review is completed when the report of the 
review is given to the Minister under subsection (3). 
Recommendations 
(8) A report of a review under subsection (1) may set out recommendations to the Commonwealth 
Government. 
(9) In formulating a recommendation that the Commonwealth Government should take particular 
action, the Climate Change Authority must analyse the costs and benefits of that action. 
(10) Subsection (9) does not prevent the Climate Change Authority from taking other matters into 
account in formulating a recommendation. 
(11) A recommendation must not be inconsistent with the objects of this Act. 
(12) If a report of a review under subsection (1) sets out one or more recommendations to the 
Commonwealth Government, the report must set out the Climate Change Authority’s reasons for 
those recommendations. 
Government response to recommendations 
(13) If a report of a review under subsection (1) sets out one or more recommendations to the 
Commonwealth Government: 
(a) as soon as practicable after receiving the report, the Minister must cause to be prepared a 
statement setting out the Commonwealth Government’s response to each of the recommendations; 
and 
(b) within 6 months after receiving the report, the Minister must cause copies of the statement to be 
tabled in each House of the Parliament. 
(14) The Commonwealth Government’s response to the recommendations may have regard to the 
views of the following: 
(a) the Climate Change Authority; 
(b) the Regulator; 
(c) such other persons as the Minister considers relevant. 
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 APPENDIX C OUTCOMES OF PREVIOUS 
REVIEWS 
This appendix lists the recommendations from previous RET reviews for easy reference (the 
Authority’s 2012 review and the 2014 Warburton review).  
The Authority's 2012 Renewable Energy Target review  
Recommendation 1 
The frequency of scheduled reviews should be amended from every two years to every four years, 
so the next scheduled review would be in 2016. 
Recommendation 2 
The form of the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target should continue to be expressed in legislation 
in terms of a fixed gigawatt-hour (GWh) level. 
Recommendation 3 
The existing Large-scale Renewable Energy Target of 41,000 GWh and interim targets should be 
maintained in their current form. 
Recommendation 4 
The RET review in 2016 is an appropriate time to consider adjusting the targets beyond 2020 in light 
of the policy and economic conditions prevailing at that time. 
Recommendation 5 
The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme should remain separate to the Large-scale Renewable 
Energy Target. 
Recommendation 6 
The threshold for solar photovoltaic units in the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme should be 
reduced from 100kW to, say, 10kW. The CCA recommends the Government conduct further 
consultation with stakeholders to determine an appropriate threshold. Units over the small-scale 
threshold would be included in the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target with five year deeming. 
Recommendation 7 
The ministerial power to lower the price cap should be retained to provide an immediate cost-
containment mechanism should installations of small-scale systems boom. 
Recommendation 8 
The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme should be phased out by reducing deeming so that 
renewable energy generation is not rewarded after 2030. 
Recommendation 9 
The Clearing House should be amended to a ‘deficit sales facility’ whereby new certificates would 
only be placed in the Clearing House when it is in deficit. 
Recommendation 10 
The requirement to submit a solar hot water heater and small generation unit return should be 
removed from the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000. 
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Recommendation 11 
The requirement to provide the out-of-pocket expense data for a small generation unit installation 
should be removed from the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001. 
Recommendation 12 
There should be no change to primary point of liability or the size threshold for coverage of grids. 
Recommendation 13 
Large electricity consumers should be permitted to opt-in to assume direct liability for RET 
obligations. The Government should consult further with stakeholders to develop a detailed approach 
to opt-in that is efficient for both large electricity users and retailers. The CCA considers that the New 
South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme opt-in model would be an appropriate starting 
point for this detailed design work. 
Recommendation 14 
No changes be made to the process for calculating individual liability. 
Recommendation 15 
The relevant Renewable Power Percentage and Small-scale Technology Percentage should be 
required to be set prior to a compliance year, and preferably by 1 December of the preceding year. 
Recommendation 16  
The current arrangements for surrender of certificates (annual surrender for the Large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target; quarterly surrender for the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme) 
should be maintained. 
Recommendation 17 
The Clean Energy Regulator should be able to refund over-surrendered certificates to a liable entity 
that ceases to trade, or transfer over-surrendered certificates if a liable entity is acquired by another 
entity which takes on a RET liability. 
Recommendation 18 
The current settings for the shortfall charge should be maintained. However, the level of the shortfall 
charge should be reconsidered by the CCA as part of its 2016 review of targets beyond 2020, or 
earlier if circumstances warrant. 
Recommendation 19 
The level of the emissions-intensive, trade-exposed exemption under the RET should be considered 
by the Productivity Commission as part of its broader review of the Jobs and Competitiveness 
Program. 
Recommendation 20 
The Government should take into consideration the impact of the RET on the competitiveness of an 
emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industry in any request to the Productivity Commission’s review 
of the level of industry assistance under the carbon pricing mechanism and the RET. 
Recommendation 21 
In cases where the RET costs are passed through to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed 
businesses, Partial Exemption Certificates should be tradeable, and thereby able to be used by any 
liable entity to reduce liable electricity acquisitions. 
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Recommendation 22 
The Government should consider opportunities for efficiencies through the alignment of application 
processes and data requirements for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries under the Jobs 
and Competitiveness Program and the RET. 
Recommendation 23 
The self-generator exemption should continue in its current form. 
Recommendation 24 
Arrangements should be developed to allow for incidental electricity offtakes under the self-
generators exemption which provide community benefits in remote locations. 
Recommendation 25 
No change is necessary to the list of eligible sources or the accreditation process for the Large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target. 
Recommendation 26 
Existing arrangements for waste coal mine gas should be maintained under the Large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target. 
Recommendation 27 
There should be no change to the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 to allow for new waste 
coal mine gas to be eligible. 
Recommendation 28 
The Government should explore whether the RET eligibility for native forest wood waste is likely to 
increase the rate of logging of native forests. If it is not, then wood waste eligibility should be 
reinstated, subject to appropriate accreditation processes designed to ensure that no additional 
logging occurs as a result. 
Recommendation 29 
Maintain the Clean Energy Council as the sole accreditation body for installers under the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme. 
Recommendation 30 
New small-scale technologies should be included on a case-by-case basis for inclusion in the Small-
scale Renewable Energy Scheme. 
Recommendation 31 
No additional new small-scale technologies should be made eligible in the Small-scale Renewable 
Energy Scheme at this time. 
Recommendation 32 
Existing arrangements for displacement technologies should be maintained.  
Recommendation 33 
No change should be made to the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 to allow additional 
displacement technologies. 
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Recommendation 34 
No change should be made to the RET framework to promote greater diversity. 
Warburton 2014 Renewable Energy Target review 
Recommendation 1 
The Renewable Energy Target (RET) should be amended in light of the changing circumstances in 
Australia’s main electricity markets and the availability of lower cost emission abatement alternatives. 
Recommendation 2 
The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) should be amended in one of the following two 
ways: 
Option 1 – Closed to new entrants (‘grandfathering’) 
In order to reduce the cost of the LRET and its impact on electricity markets, the Panel recommends 
that the LRET should be closed to new entrants. 
a. The LRET is closed to new renewable energy power stations (subject to limited exceptions 
described below). The Clean Energy Regulator (CER) should set targets annually based on 
estimated output from accredited power stations. 
b. In addition to those renewable energy power stations already accredited under the scheme, 
eligibility would be extended to: 
i. Renewable energy power stations already under construction. 
ii. Renewable energy power stations to be constructed where project proponents can demonstrate 
that there is full financial and contractual commitment to the project (e.g., final investment decision, 
engineering and procurement contract) within one month of the announcement of this approach. 
c. The last year of the operation of the LRET is 2030. 
or 
Option 2 – Share of growth in electricity demand 
In order to provide support for new renewable power stations and contribute to Australia’s emissions 
reduction target while achieving less reduction than Option 1 in the cost of the LRET, the Panel 
recommends that the target be set to allocate a share of growth in electricity demand to renewables 
in the following manner: 
a. The target is set annually by the CER, increasing each year to 2020 by an amount equivalent to 
50 per cent of projected growth in national electricity demand, ensuring that new renewable energy 
power stations are only supported under the RET where electricity demand is increasing. 
b. Where national electricity demand is projected to remain flat or fall, the target is held at the 
previous year’s level. 
c. From 2021 onwards, the target is fixed at the 2020 level until 2030, the last year of the operation of 
the LRET. 
Based on current electricity demand forecasts, this approach would achieve a 20 per cent share of 
renewables in the electricity generation mix by 2020. 
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Recommendation 3 
The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) should be amended in one of the following two 
ways: 
Option 1 – Abolition 
In order to address the cost of the SRES (and its effect on electricity markets), the Panel 
recommends that it be closed immediately in the following manner: 
a. The SRES should terminate upon announcement. 
b. Those who contracted before the announcement for the installation of a small-scale system should 
receive the certificates they would have done. 
or 
Option 2 – Bring forward the phase-out of the SRES 
In order to reduce the cost of the SRES while providing some support for new small-scale renewable 
energy systems, the Panel recommends that the phase-out of the SRES be brought forward in the 
following manner, to take effect immediately: 
a. Bring forward the last year of operation of the SRES from 2030 to 2020. 
b. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for rooftop solar PV systems from 
15 years to 10 years, and in each year from 2016 onwards further reduce the period for which 
certificates may be created, as set out below: 
Rooftop solar PV: period certificates may be created 
YEAR INSTALLED PERIOD 
Prior to announcement 15 years 
From announcement 10 years 
2016 9 years 
2017 8 years 
2018 7 years 
2019 6 years 
2020 5 years 
2021 Scheme closed 
 
c. Reduce system size eligibility threshold for rooftop solar PV systems from no more than100 
kilowatts to no more than 10 kilowatts. 
d. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for solar and heat pump water heaters by 
one year each year, commencing in 2016, as set out below: 
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Solar and heat pump water heaters: period certificates may be created 
YEAR INSTALLED PERIOD 
Prior to 2016 10 years 
2016 9 years 
2017 8 years 
2018 7 years 
2019 6 years 
2020 5 years 
2021 Scheme closed 
 
Recommendation 4 
The current partial exemption arrangements for emissions-intensive trade-exposed businesses 
should be maintained. 
Recommendation 5 
The self-generation exemption should be amended to extend the one kilometre radius restriction and 
to permit self-generators to supply incidental amounts of electricity (below a set threshold) to third 
parties without attracting a RET liability. The Government should consult with affected parties to 
determine an appropriate distance limit and threshold for incidental off-takes. 
Recommendation 6 
The Government’s commitment to the reinstatement of native forest wood waste as a renewable 
energy source under the LRET should be implemented through the reintroduction of the relevant 
regulations in force prior to 2011. 
Recommendation 7 
The requirement for statutory reviews of the scheme should be removed from the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 2000. 
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 GLOSSARY  
TERM ACRONYM/ 
ABBREVIATION 
EXPLANATION 
Australian Energy 
Market Operator 
AEMO The Australian Energy Market Operator was established in 
2009 and is responsible for the operation of the National 
Electricity Market, which includes the east and south-east 
regions of Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia). 
bankable 
certificates 
 Renewable energy certificates for both the large-scale and 
small-scale market do not have an expiry date. They may 
be purchased and held for any length of time before they 
are surrendered.  
certificate costs  The amount passed on by liable parties (generally 
electricity retailers) to end-users to account for the costs of 
purchasing and surrendering Large-scale Generation 
Certificates (LGCs) and Small-scale Technology 
Certificates (STCs). 
carbon pricing 
mechanism 
 The carbon pricing mechanism created a price on 
emissions by requiring large emitters to report on and 
surrender emissions units for their covered emissions. The 
carbon pricing mechanism commenced operation on 1 
July 2012 and was abolished with effect from 1 July 2014. 
Clean Energy 
Regulator 
CER The Clean Energy Regulator is an independent statutory 
authority that administers regulatory schemes relating to 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, including the 
Renewable Energy Target, the Carbon Farming Initiative 
and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
Scheme. 
Climate Change 
Authority 
‘the Authority’ Established on 1 July 2012, the Climate Change Authority 
provides independent expert advice on Australian 
Government climate change mitigation initiatives. 
commercial-scale 
PV 
 Larger capacity rooftop solar PV installed on non-
residential premises.  
compliance period  A full calendar year, the period over which each annual 
target under the Renewable Energy Target must be 
achieved.  
Council of 
Australian 
Governments 
COAG The peak intergovernmental forum in Australia. The 
members of the Council of Australian Governments are the 
Prime Minister, State and Territory Premiers and Chief 
Ministers and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association. 
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TERM ACRONYM/ 
ABBREVIATION 
EXPLANATION 
deeming  The estimation of the amount of electricity a solar panel or 
small-scale wind or hydro system generates, or the 
electricity a solar water heater or heat pump displaces. 
Deeming allows the owners of these technologies to 
receive their entitlement to small-scale technology 
certificates before the system has produced or displaced 
the electricity.  
emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed 
EITE Businesses conducting specified emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed (EITE) activities are eligible for assistance 
under the RET scheme. 
gigawatt hours GWh A measure of electricity generation or use over a period of 
time (or energy). 
Intergovernmental 
panel on climate 
change 
IPCC Scientific intergovernmental body that produces reports 
that support the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which is the main international treaty on 
climate change 
kilowatt kW A measure of power. 
kilowatt hour kWh A measure of electricity generation or use over a period of 
time (or energy). 
Kyoto Protocol   An agreement adopted under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997. It 
entered into force in 2005. 
Large-scale 
Generation 
Certificate 
LGC Represents one megawatt hour of renewable energy 
generation. 
Large-scale 
Renewable Energy 
Target 
LRET Encourages the deployment of large-scale renewable 
electricity projects such as wind farms. 
levelised cost of 
electricity 
LCOE A common tool for measuring and comparing power 
generation costs across different technologies. It 
represents the per kilowatt hour cost (in real dollars) of 
building and operating a generation technology over an 
assumed financial life and duty cycle. 
liable entities  Entities that make wholesale acquisitions of electricity and 
are required by the legislation to surrender a specified 
number of renewable certificates or pay a renewable 
energy shortfall charge.  
Mandatory 
Renewable Energy 
Target 
MRET The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target began 
operation in 2001. It had a target of 9,500 gigawatt hours 
in 2010 (mandated out to 2020) and interim targets that 
gradually increased year on year.  
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TERM ACRONYM/ 
ABBREVIATION 
EXPLANATION 
megawatt MW A measure of power (or demand). 
megawatt hour MWh A measure of electricity generation/use over a period of 
time (or energy). 
merchant generator  A stand-alone electricity generator that does not have a 
power purchase agreement (PPA) with an electricity 
retailer, but rather sells its production to the spot and 
short-term forward markets. 
mothballing  The preservation of a production facility without using it to 
produce. Machinery in a mothballed facility is kept in 
working order so that production may be restored quickly if 
needed. 
multiplier credits  Credits that are a multiple of the number of certificates that 
an eligible technology would generally be able to create. 
Previously in place under the Small-scale Renewable 
Energy Scheme. 
National Electricity 
Market 
NEM The National Electricity Market interconnects five regional 
market jurisdictions (Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania). Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory are not connected to the 
National Electricity Market. 
native demand  Electricity load serviced by scheduled electricity 
generation, semi-scheduled generation and embedded 
generation (including rooftop solar PV). 
net present value NPV Net present value is a standard method for using the time 
value of money to estimate future costs. It compares the 
present value of money today to the present value of 
money in the future, taking inflation into account. 
partial exemption 
certificate 
PEC The Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 and the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 include 
provisions to provide partial exemption from Renewable 
Energy Target liability for electricity used in defined 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities. To obtain 
exemption, prescribed persons may apply to the Clean 
Energy Regulator for a partial exemption certificate. 
power purchase 
agreement 
PPA A long-term agreement between an electricity generator 
and electricity retailer to purchase electricity generated 
(and in the case of renewable generators, LGCs). 
‘real’ 20 per cent 
target 
 A 2020 LRET target based on 20 per cent of either current 
estimated or actual electricity demand in 2020. The current 
2020 LRET target is for a fixed amount of generation 
(41,000 GWh). 
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TERM ACRONYM/ 
ABBREVIATION 
EXPLANATION 
Renewable Energy 
Certificate 
REC The term used for renewable energy certificates generated 
under the Renewable Energy Target scheme prior to 2011. 
Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 
2000 (Cth) 
REE Act The legislative framework for the Renewable Energy 
Target scheme. 
Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) 
Regulations 2001 
REE Regulation The detailed rules and provisions of the Renewable 
Energy Target scheme. 
Renewable Energy 
Target 
RET The Renewable Energy Target operates in two parts—the 
Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme and the 
Large-scale Renewable Energy Target. 
Renewable Energy 
Target review 
RET review The Climate Change Authority’s review of the Renewable 
Energy Target. The review is defined in Section 162 of the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth). 
shortfall charge  A charge that applies to the outstanding amount when a 
liable entity surrenders less than the required number of 
certificates to meet obligations under the LRET or SRES. 
The shortfall charge under both the LRET and SRES is 
currently set at $65. 
solar photovoltaic PV A method of generating electricity by converting the sun’s 
energy into electricity. 
small-scale PV  Rooftop solar PV installed on by households. Also referred 
to as ‘household PV’. 
Small-scale 
Renewable Energy 
Scheme 
SRES Supports the installation of small-scale systems, including 
solar photovoltaic systems and solar water heaters, and 
small generation units. 
Small-scale 
Technology 
Certificate 
STC Certificates created by small-scale technologies like solar 
panels and solar water heaters. 
Small-scale 
Technology 
Certificate Clearing 
House 
STC Clearing 
House 
Facilitates the exchange of small-scale technology 
certificates between buyers and sellers at the fixed price of 
$40 (excluding GST). 
thermal generators  A power station in which electricity is generated by the 
production of steam. The steam is typically produced by 
burning fossil fuels such as gas and coal.  
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TERM ACRONYM/ 
ABBREVIATION 
EXPLANATION 
Warburton review  A review of the Renewable Energy Target conducted in 
2014 by a panel headed by Dick Warburton AO LVO, 
supported by a secretariat located within the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
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 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
TERM MEANING 
AEMC Australian Energy Market Commission 
AEMO Australian Energy Market Operator 
AiG Australian Industry Group 
AO Officer of the Order of Australia 
APVI Australian Photovoltaic Institute 
BCA Business Council of Australia 
BNEF Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
BREE Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
CCA Climate Change Authority 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CEC Clean Energy Council 
CER Clean Energy Regulator 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
CO2-e Carbon dioxide equivalent 
COAG Council of Australian Governments 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
Cth Commonwealth 
DIICCSRTE Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education 
EITE Emission-intensive trade-exposed 
ERF Emissions Reduction Fund 
ESAA Energy Supply Association of Australia 
GWh Gigawatt hour 
IEA International Energy Agency 
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TERM MEANING 
IES Intelligent Energy Systems 
IGCC Investor Group on Climate Change 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
kW Kilowatt 
kWh Kilowatt hour 
LGC Large-scale Generation Certificate 
LRET Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
LVO Lieutenant of the Royal Victorian Order 
MRET Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
Mt Million tonnes 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt hour 
NPV Net present value 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PPA Power Purchase Agreement 
PV Photovoltaic 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
REC Renewable Energy Certificate 
REE Act Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) 
RET Renewable Energy Target 
SKM  Sinclair Knight Merz  
SKM MMA Sinclair Knight Merz and McLennan Magasanik Associates 
SRES Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme 
STC Small-scale Technology Certificate 
SWH Solar water heater 
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TERM MEANING 
t Tonne 
Wh Watt hour 
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